Unambiguously yours

There’s an old joke about a tourist in Ireland asking for directions and getting the reply ‘If I was you, I wouldn’t start from here’. To anyone in the position of wondering whether to contact all of the people on their mailing list to get GDPR-standard consent to send marketing, fund-raising or promotional emails and texts, I can only say this: I wouldn’t start from here.

With apologies to regular readers who already know (there must be six of you by now), the problem comes because most of the people advising on the solution don’t seem to know what the problem is. They think that the General Data Protection Regulation makes a significant change to the nature of consent from what is required now, and so they tell their clients and employers that there is an urgent need to carry out a ‘re-consenting’ exercise. A memo has clearly gone out – a distinguished correspondent has sent me two examples of organisations sending out emails to get consent in the past week, and yesterday, the charity Stonewall used Valentine’s Day as a prompt to beg its supporters to ‘not leave us this way’. It was lovely, and it is probably an admission that Stonewall have been acting unlawfully since at least 2003, if not 1998.

Here’s the problem. The 1995 Data Protection Directive defines consent like this:

any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed

and

the data subject has unambiguously given his consent

If you’re new to this, read those sentences a few times. Think about ‘freely given’. Think about the consent being an ‘indication’, something by which the person ‘signifies’ their ‘agreement’. Think about ‘unambiguously given‘. If you think that this be interpreted as an opt-out, where are your car keys? Consent, according to you, is me taking your car keys and leaving you a legalistic note somewhere that says that unless you tell me not to borrow your car, I can borrow your car. Or because I borrowed it another time and you didn’t object, I can keep borrowing your car until you tell me not to.

This is nonsense. Consent cannot be inferred. It cannot be implied. A badly written opt-out buried in terms and conditions, consent assumed because I made a donation, the fact that you have my email address and you assume that I must have given it to you with my consent for marketing rather than (for example) you bought it from a list broker who launders dodgy data like drug money – none of these examples constitute consent. Consent is consent. You asked and I said yes. We all know what it means and to pretend otherwise is to lie so you can persuade yourself that you can spam people.

Yes, the GDPR adds a couple of things. It requires consent to be ‘demonstrable’. It states explicitly that consent can only be obtained by a ‘statement or by a clear affirmative action’. But if you claim that the absence of the above phrase in the Directive is any help to the opt-out model, you’re lying to yourself. An opt-out is inherently ambiguous, and the directive says that consent cannot be unambiguous. I might have misunderstood the wording (especially if the language was clunky or technical, which it often is), the data may have been obtained for a different purpose and the consent option is buried in terms and conditions, I might just have missed it or forgotten. The Directive is clear.

Jump ahead to the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations, based on Directive 2002/58/EC (often known the ePrivacy Directive). The definition of consent comes from the Data Protection Directive, and so if the ePrivacy Directive says you need consent, what you need is unambiguous, freely given, specific and informed consent. The ePrivacy Directive is enacted by the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, or PECR (which all good people pronounce as ‘Pecker’ and revel in the opportunities that doing so affords them).

PECR makes life even harder for the opt-outers. For emails, PECR says that the recipient must have “previously notified the sender that he consents for the time being to such communications being sent by, or at the instigation of, the sender“. If you think that a person can ‘notify’ you by not doing something (i.e. not opting-out), once again, where are your car keys?

Surprisingly given all the execrable practice to which the Commissioner happily turns a blind eye, Wilmslow fired a shot across everyone’s bows with three enforcement cases last year. Morrisons and Flybe are to some extent red herrings as they deliberately targeted people who had explicitly opted out of receiving direct marketing, so when the companies emailed them asking them to opt back in, it was plainly bullshit. The Honda case is more interesting, in the sense that Honda ignored everyone who had opted in (because they’d opted in) and everyone who had opted out (naturally). They contacted people where they didn’t know either way, where they held no evidence of consent. Despite the fact that in all three cases, the contact itself wasn’t selling anything, all were sent for marketing purposes, and here, the ICO argued that the organisations didn’t have consent for sending emails for marketing purposes. It’s been argued by idiots that all Honda were trying to do was comply with GDPR, but that’s patently false. They were trying to pack out their marketing list before a perceived change in the law (GDPR) while ignoring another law that was just fine thanks (PECR).

And now we come to the payoff. If Stonewall (and all the others) have consent to send fund-raising emails, they don’t need to ask again. If they don’t have freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous consent, they shouldn’t be sending emails for marketing purposes now, even if the purpose is to ask for consent from people who are happy to give it because the email is inherently unlawful. It wouldn’t be unlawful for Stonewall to write to all of its supporters and ask them for consent, because post isn’t electronic so PECR doesn’t apply. I would say that there is plainly a legitimate interest for them to use post to ask people for permission to send fund-raising and promotional correspondence by email, so there is no GDPR problem.

The problem with a re-consenting exercise is that the organisation is basically admitting to a PECR breach. The problem is exacerbated by doing that re-consenting exercise by email, because as Honda have demonstrated, doing so is in itself a breach of PECR. People complained to the ICO about the Honda emails, which is why they enforced. If you do a re-consenting exercise by email, anyone irritated enough by the request may well complain. Then what?

So what do I think organisations should do in the light of all this? Well, I wouldn’t start from here. But ignoring the law for a moment, this might be a time to be pragmatic. If you send people content that they want and you don’t annoy them (email being less annoying and distracting than phone or text in my opinion), if you have nice big bright unsubscribe buttons, and if YOU RESPECT BLOODY UNSUBSCRIBE REQUESTS (Hello Daily Telegraph), what’s the risk? Why draw attention to yourself?

I am convinced that sending emails to people who haven’t opted-in is unlawful unless you’ve got the soft opt-in (which because it’s predicated on data gathered through a sale, most charities won’t have). But many organisations have been content to do that for years despite it being unlawful now. So what’s actually changing? I think everyone should comply with the law because privacy – the right to be left alone – is a vital foundation for a civilised society. But if you’re sitting on a mailing list and you’re not sure what to do with it, I would forgive you if you took a slower, longer path, taking every natural opportunity to get renewed consent from existing contacts, getting strong unambiguous consent from anyone new, and hoping that churn and natural wastage gets you where you need to be. And if you’re wrestling with this right now and you’ve read this far, good luck and best wishes.

Stinking Badges

The list of things that annoy me about the explosion of hype and bullshit around GDPR is long and boring (NOTE TO SELF: this list should be a blog post of its own). I cannot say that top of the list are those badges that folk give their products, boasting about being “GDPR Ready”, or “GDPR Compliant” when nobody actually knows what being ready or compliant looks like, but they’re top five.

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I was complaining about this on Twitter, and lovely people who enjoy seeing me annoyed started to send me examples of these badges from across the internet. It is via this route that I came to Emailmovers, a data broker who make luxurious claims about their data and its relationship to the GDPR.

Not only do Emailmovers have a badge, they claim to have been working closely with both the Direct Marketing Association and the Information Commissioner’s Office on GDPR issues. Indeed, until someone kicked up a fuss about it, Emailmovers had the Information Commissioner’s logo on their website. The logo has gone now, but if you work out where it was and click, there is an invisible link to the ICO’s website where it used to be.

Emailmovers certainly put up a strong case about the nature of the data they’re selling:

1) We are clear with individuals why we need their data at the point of collection
2) We always use clear and concise language appropriate for our target audience
3) We give individuals control over their data. They are always able to decide whether to share their personal data with us or not
4) Under the GDPR principle accountability, Emailmovers is able to demonstrate that we are compliant. We always record the legal grounds for processing an individual’s personal data

I can’t say that any of this is untrue, although I am sceptical. Generally, I think that the data broking industry is irredeemable, incapable of operating lawfully either now or in the future. The data broker acquires data, accumulates and appends it, and then sells it to clients. This is the opposite of fair. However, and wherever the data was obtained from, whatever transparency or fair processing was given to the subject, it would be vague. It could not say which specific organisations would receive the data, and often, it could not even say which sectors. The data broker does not know – they sell to whoever is buying. This kills consent – which was supposed to be informed and specific since 1995 – and it kills legitimate interest. How can you assess the effect on the subject if you don’t know when obtaining the data what you’re going to do with it? If a data broker obtained individual email data under legitimate interest, they couldn’t sell it on for marketing purposes, because the client will not have consent to send the marketing in question by email.

None of this will stop the data broking industry from carrying on – when some of the biggest brokers are ICO stakeholders whose activities have gone unchecked for decades, it’s hard to imagine that the GDPR will make much of a difference.

Nevertheless, there was one thing about all this that I was able to check. I made an FOI request to the ICO asking about contact that Emailmovers had had with the Commissioner’s Office, particularly with the policy and liaison teams. If Emailmovers really had been working closely with the ICO, there would be evidence of this, right? The ICO’s response was revealing:

There was no direct contact between Emailmovers and our Strategic Liaison/ policy department concerning advice about GDPR.”

Emailmovers had made a couple of enquiries – ICO was too cautious to tell me what they asked, but they supplied the replies which offer no more than a simple (but accurate) explanation that business to business communications are covered by the GDPR, a brief observation that the ePrivacy Regulation is coming but we cannot be sure what it will say, and separately, a straightforward note that even corporate subscribers need fair processing. This is not working closely with the ICO – they asked a couple of questions and got short polite answers. There are no meetings, no detailed correspondence, nothing at all to suggest anything approaching the relationship they boast about here:

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I can honestly say that I am in regular contact with the ICO about a variety of matters. It sounds good, but it’s true only because I nearly gave evidence in one of their prosecutions (they didn’t need me in the end), I make a lot of FOI requests to them, and I tweet at them almost daily.

I don’t accept that making a couple of enquiries equates to working closely with someone. The fact that Emailmovers make this claim on their website, and displayed the ICO logo prominently until recently makes me very uneasy about the other things they say. The GDPR sector is full of bullshit and exaggeration, fake certifications, hokey badges and bluster. As we near the supposed cliff edge of May 25th, we should all take the time to check every claim with great scepticism, and to treat the badge-toting hordes with the same caution that Humphrey Bogart treated a certain bogus Federale:

Brand new key

Parents at schools in Suffolk recently received an interesting piece of correspondence about an exciting initiative called ‘Suffolk SAFEKey‘, offered by Suffolk Police. For as little as £1 a month, subscribers to the service receive a special key fob with a reference number on it. Once registered, if the keys are lost, the person can use the reference number to contact Suffolk Police’s commercial partner (Keycare Limited) to get keys and owner reunited, incentivised by a £10 reward.

Alerted to this by a concerned citizen, I made an FOI request to Suffolk Police to find out more about the scheme, the arrangement with Keycare Limited, and how the email came to be sent. Suffolk Police told me that they contacted all 18 secondary schools in the county (by phone, so I don’t know how the request was couched), and of those, 8 forwarded the invitation to join SAFEKey to all parents. The force were unhelpfully vague about who else had been approached. I asked who they had contacted, and their answer conflated those they approached and those they claim had approached them. This means I know that those involved are charities (Suffolk Community Foundation / Age UK), “advocacy groups” (whatever that means), Neighbourhood Watch, the University of Suffolk and “lunch clubs and other such groups”, but I don’t know who contacted who.

On one issue, Suffolk Police were admirably clear. I asked them how they had obtained consent to send the email. This was their reply:

The parentmail service is not controlled by the Constabulary and the information provided is not personal data and as such, there is no requirement for us to obtain consent from those third party recipients.

Regulation 22 of the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003 (AKA PECR)  applies to emails and texts, and it is remarkably unambiguous, despite all the dodgy marketers and list brokers who purport not to understand it.

a person shall neither transmit, nor instigate the transmission of, unsolicited communications for the purposes of direct marketing by means of electronic mail unless the recipient of the electronic mail has previously notified the sender that he consents for the time being to such communications being sent by, or at the instigation of, the sender

Suffolk Police instigated the sending of the email to parents by making an unsolicited approach to schools, asking them to send it. The email would not have been sent unless they had asked for it to be sent. Regulation 22 does not require them to be the sender. Should there be any doubt about this, the ICO asked Better Together to sign an undertaking following their misbegotten texts during the Scottish Independence campaign. Better Together used an agency – they never held the data and they didn’t send the texts. This is exactly the same situation. There are only two ways that marketing emails could be sent in this way: either parents would have to give consent direct to Suffolk Police, or give consent to the school to receive marketing from the force. This second possibility is one the ICO is keen to play down, as their Direct Marketing Guidance makes clear:

Indirect consent may therefore be valid if that organisation was specifically named. But if the consent was more general (eg marketing ‘from selected third parties’) this will not demonstrate valid consent to marketing calls, texts or emails.

Of course, as the senders of the emails, the schools have also breached PECR. And taking it one stage further, you could argue that Suffolk Police have also breached the Data Protection Act by processing personal data unfairly and unlawfully. If they don’t have a data processor contract with the schools, they may even have breached the seventh principle.

Many public bodies and charities struggle with PECR because they perceive ‘marketing’ as a purely commercial activity. This means that they think the messages they send are somehow not marketing, and are surprised when PECR bites. Suffolk Police can be under no such illusion. SAFEKey is not a policing activity, it is a wholly commercial venture, with the income split 50/50 between the force and Keycare Ltd. Moreover, there is an argument that the force is exploiting its position as a law enforcement body to promote its commercial activities – it’s unlikely that secondary schools would forward information about double glazing or PPI. The force might want this to seem like an aspect of their crime prevention work, but it isn’t – it’s a purely commercial venture. No public body, but especially not the police, should exploit their position as partners with other, smaller public bodies to plug their commercial activities.

There are other concerns. The force didn’t carry out a Privacy Impact Assessment before launching the SAFEKey scheme, which is surprising, as the project involves the force gathering personal data it does not need to carry out its legal functions, purely for the purpose of a commercial venture, using a variety of unrelated bodies as a conduit for the data and transmitting it to a commercial partner. At the very least, you would expect them to consider the risks. Moreover, although the extract I received from the contract between Keycare and Suffolk Police does make it clear that Keycare cannot use or share the personal data they receive for their own purposes, the security demands made by the police are relentlessly generic.

I don’t think the police should exploit the significant position of trust they enjoy to flog commercial services at all. But even if you disagree, there can be no question than when they do, the police should at all times obey the law. They haven’t done so here, and the ICO should investigate. As I did not receive one of the emails, they would ignore any complaint that I made, but they should intervene to make clear to all public bodies how PECR works.

 

Labour pains

Saving Labour is a new organisation dedicated to replacing Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the Labour Party. It may quickly need to be saved from itself. An extract from a document that appears to be from Saving Labour is being circulated on Twitter by Corbyn supporters, annoyed about what it contains. The documents contains advice on how to obtain personal data of lapsed members who are likely to be anti-Corbyn because they left the party when around the time he became leader. The document then advocates contacting them for support.

Two things: I do not know the provenance of the document, and the allegation that it comes from Saving Labour or Progress may be untrue. This may be the work of a rogue individual, and so Saving Labour may not be responsible. If this is the case, they should make this clear, urgently and ensure that data is not obtained or processed in their name.

Second thing: I am a member of the Labour Party, and I do not support Jeremy Corbyn. I’m not even one of those ‘Corbyn can’t win’ people; if he could win, I wouldn’t want him to. Nevertheless, there is a strong likelihood that the Data Protection Act is being breached, and I think this needs to be addressed.

If Saving Labour (or rogue individuals) are attempting to recruit Labour members back into Labour, then the processing of data is likely to be a breach of Data Protection’s fairness requirements. If Saving Labour are trying to recruit members to Saving Labour’s mailing list or retaining data for its purposes, it’s potentially a lot worse. The most important thing here is that Saving Labour is not a faction of Labour; it is a separate Data Controller with its own Data Protection notification. If Saving Labour are obtaining data or getting others to obtain it on their behalf and for their purposes without Labour’s knowledge, it’s at least a civil breach of Data Protection.

Section 55 of the Data Protection Act makes it a criminal offence to obtain, disclose or procure the disclosure of personal data without the authorisation of the Data Controller. It’s not a criminal offence to obtain and disclose personal data without consent. The crucial element of S55 is the procuring or disclosing personal data without the authorisation of the Data Controller. The Data Controller isn’t an individual person (a common misconception) but it is the organisation as a whole. Nevertheless, if an individual who is clearly entitled to make decisions on the organisation’s behalf approved the disclosure, it’s not a criminal offence. If this data is being obtained and processing on behalf of  Saving Labour, there are specific defences that can be used, but these should be tested.

Of course, if the data has been obtained without Saving Labour’s knowledge and is being used for purposes that have not be authorised by the Labour Party, the individuals responsible for harvesting and processing the data could themselves be potentially in the frame for S55 offence, rather than Saving Labour.

Even if a senior Labour Party official gave explicit approval for someone to harvest personal data and use it, the likelihood of a Data Protection breach is still high. Unless the Labour Party told members that that their data would be shared with another organisation or processed after their membership had lapsed for marketing purposes, then the disclosure / processing would be a breach of the First Data Protection principle, which requires all processing of personal data to be fair. The chief element of fairness is that the person is told about how their data will be processed.

Though it’s possible that Labour told members that their information might be passed to affiliated organisations (which is relevant if Saving Labour receive the information or it is used on their behalf), it’s exceptionally unlikely that Labour would told members that their data would be processed after their membership had lapsed. Regardless of whether Saving Labour receive the data, processing it after the membership has lapsed is likely to breach the First principle unless Labour can demonstrate that members were told explicitly.

Of course, if Labour approved this, then Saving Labour could be considered to be a Data Processor carrying out a recruitment drive on the party’s behalf. If this is the case, unless Saving Labour is covered by a legally binding contract, this is a breach of the Seventh Principle.

It doesn’t end there. The document encourages MPs and councillors to “call” lapsed members to encourage them to join. As I blogged only yesterday, every part of the Data Protection system has made clear that calls made for the purposes of political campaigning are marketing – so if the callers do not screen any telephone numbers against the Telephone Preference Service, it would be a breach of the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations. If they send emails or texts without explicit consent from the person, it would be a breach of PECR. It’s extremely hard to imagine that any consent given to the Labour Party could survive a lapsed membership, and Saving Labour would not have that consent in the first place. Let me emphasise for new readers: there is no political exemption from PECR, there is no ‘we can call our members / ex-members’ exemption.

The ICO has already shown itself willing to enforce on political campaigning by issuing Enforcement Notices in the last decade against the SNP, the Labour Party, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, and by issuing a monetary penalty for unsolicited texts against Leave.EU a few months ago, Last year, I blogged wearily about Labour’s idiotic and unfair purge of registered supporters. I and others have constantly pointed out their terrible marketing practices. And here we are again; another mess, another possible misuse of data, and at some point, the ICO dragged into it all over again to sort out another family dispute.

 

Less than ideal

Last week, Stephen Lee, an academic and former fundraiser was reported as having attacked the Information Commissioner’s Office for their interpretation of direct marketing at a fundraising conference. It was, he said “outrageous” that the Commissioner’s direct marketing guidance stated that any advertising or marketing material that promoted the aims and ideals of a not-for-profit organisation was covered by Data Protection. According to Lee, only fundraising activities should be considered to be marketing.

[NB: Third Sector articles are sometimes open to all and sometimes limited to subscribers. If the links don’t work, please accept my apologies!]

He is quoted as saying “Who says that’s right? Just the ICO. Who did it consult? No one.” and  went on to say “Why and how and in what way should we be compelled to comply with that proposition?”

Who says that’s right? Who did the ICO consult? Well, let me see now.

1) The Council of Europe

In 1985, the Council of Europe issued a Recommendation on the protection of personal data used for the purposes of direct marketing. The definition of direct marketing includes both the offer of goods or services and “any other messages” to a segment of the population. The recommendation predates the guidance Mr Lee disparages by more than 30 years.

2) The 1995 Data Protection Directive

The Directive makes clear that direct marketing rules apply equally to charitable organisations and political parties as they do to commercial organisations, and emphasises the need for people to be able to opt-out of direct marketing. By redrawing the definition, Mr Lee would contradict this fundamental right.

3) The Data Protection Act 1998

Given that Mr Lee feels qualified to make bold statements about the interpretation of the Data Protection Act, it’s odd that he doesn’t seem to have taken the time to read it. Section 11 of the Act states that the definition of Direct Marketing “the communication (by whatever means) of any advertising and marketing material which is directed at particular individuals”. The important word there is “any” – organisations do not get to pick and choose which of their promotional messages are covered and which are not.

4) The Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003

PECR sets up the rules for consent over electronic direct marketing (consent for automated calls, opt-out and TPS for live calls, consent for emails and texts). It does not define direct marketing, but instead says this “Expressions used in these Regulations that are not defined in paragraph (1) and are defined in the Data Protection Act 1998 shall have the same meaning as in that Act”. Therefore, the DPA definition applies to PECR.

5) The Information Tribunal (now the First Tier Tribunal)

In 2005, the Information Commissioner served an Enforcement Notice on the Scottish National Party after they repeatedly and unrepentantly used automated calls featuring Sean Connery to promote the party in the General Election. The SNP appealed, and in 2006, the Information Tribunal considered the issue. One of the main elements of the SNP appeal was against the ICO’s definition of direct marketing. Although the case is about a political party, the ICO’s submissions are based on the proposition that charities as well as political parties are covered by the definition of direct marketing, and that the definition cannot be restricted to fundraising alone. The Tribunal accepted the ICO’s view in full, and dismissed the appeal.

6) The charity sector and anyone else who wanted to be consulted

The ICO may have issued guidance in the 1980s or 1990s on the definition of direct marketing, but the idea that promoting aims and ideals is part of it has been their view since 1999. In guidance issued on the precursor to PECR, the ICO stated clearly that direct marketing includes “not just to the offer for sale of goods or services, but also the promotion of an organisations aims and ideals”. They specifically mentioned charities, as they have ever since. Virtually every iteration of the ICO’s guidance on PECR and direct marketing has been subject to public consultation – indeed, the very guidance Lee is talking about was subject to a public consultation.

Here’s the problem. Lee is an Honorary Fellow of the Institute of Fundraising, and has a long association with it. The IoF has been the most consistently pernicious influence on the charity sector’s compliance with data protection and privacy law in the past ten years. Their guidance and public utterances on data protection are often misleading, and they recently had to change their own Code of Practice because it was legally incorrect. At best, they haven’t noticed the ICO position on charities and direct marketing for more than 15 years. At worst, they deliberately ignored it in favour of an interpretation that largely suits fundraisers. Lee complained at the conference about the “appalling” communication between the ICO and charity umbrella bodies, but Richard Marbrow of the ICO summed the problem up all too well:

One of the things the sector asked for was clarity, and I will try and bring you that. The trouble is, if you then say ‘we don’t like that clarity, could we have some different clarity please?’, we’re not going to get on very well.”

The most important thing about Lee’s outburst is the subtext – if any form of communication is not covered by the definition of direct marketing, then your consent is not required  in the first place and you have no right to stop receiving it. His interpretation is nonsense, but it is also ethically unsound. At its most basic level, privacy means the right to be left alone, the right to have an area of your life which is yours, which others can’t intrude into. Lee seems to want to erode that right. If his view was correct (it’s not), charities could bombard people with phone calls, texts or emails to tell them how marvellous they are, how important their work is, how vital they are for society. As long as they don’t ask for money, the logic of his argument is that people wouldn’t be able to stop them.

Lee’s other question (“Why and how and in what way should we be compelled to comply with that proposition?”) has an easy answer. Ignore it. Carry on breaching the law, ignoring the rules. I went to the cinema last night and saw adverts for two different charities that plainly breached PECR, so that seems to be the plan. Given that the furore over charities began with an innocent person bombarded with unwanted correspondence, it’s remarkable that senior figures in the charity sector are ready for another go, but if Mr Lee wants to drag charities’ reputations deeper into a swamp that they share with PPI scammers and payday loan merchants, he’s welcome.

But the ICO should not listen to their concerns, or open friendly channels of communication with the sector. They should apply the law firmly and regularly until the charities get the message. If this results in more enforcement against charities than other sectors, that will be only because the big charities are among the worst offenders and they haven’t put their houses in order. If charity giving suffers as a result, even amongst the many charities that have not transgressed, they should stop blaming others and look to their fundraisers, their colleagues and themselves.