Categories
Personal Injury

Financial Recovery in a Personal Injury Settlement

The legal definition of personal injury varies greatly depending on who you ask. A personal injury attorney is a lawyer that focuses his or her professional practice on the defense of those who have been the direct victims of another person’s wrongful action. Personal injury cases can include injuries, medical malpractice, work related illnesses and injuries, and wrongful death. It can also encompass slander, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, defamation, as well as civil wrongs, such as battery, false arrest, dog bites, etc. It is the intent of a personal injury attorney to seek justice for those that have been harmed either physically or emotionally through the negligence of another person or business entity. If you think you have a case, contact a personal injury lawyer today.

 

If you believe that you have fallen victim to this wrongful act of another party, your first step should be to contact a San Diego personal injury law firm. There are several ways to do this. One way is to employ an attorney that you already know and trust. Another way is to employ an attorney that you have only heard of through the grapevine. However, if you cannot locate an attorney in San Diego that suits your needs, you may need to research your options. There are many resources available to help you find the attorney that will best meet your needs.

 

Your local phone book should contain a listing of San Diego attorneys who specialize in personal injury claims. You should also contact the San Diego State Attorney’s Office and the state Bar Association for a list of attorneys in San Diego who are experienced in the area of personal injury claims and accidents. When contacting the State Attorneys’ Offices, you will want to inquire about any cases that they may have handled in the past. By researching the experience of the attorneys that are listed with the San Diego phone book or the state Bar Association, you will be able to determine which attorney will best handle your case.

 

Once you have researched the attorney’s record, it is time to contact them. You will want to schedule a consultation to discuss your case with these San Diego personal injury firms. During the consultation, you should be given the opportunity to ask questions about your case. You should also be given the opportunity to request a free evaluation. Many attorneys offer a free evaluation during this time. The San Diego personal injury firm will be able to provide you with the results of this evaluation and recommend a suitable attorney.

 

Financial recovery is often a substantial issue for accident victims. The financial recovery percentage will depend on many different factors including the extent of your injuries, any supporting documents that are required for your claim, the amount of time that you have had to recover, the cost of your medical treatment and other factors. While your San Diego personal injury law firm should not take your pay check away if you do not receive the full amount of compensation that you are owed, they should try to work with you to ensure that you receive as much money as possible. Your San Diego attorney should work closely with you to ensure that you receive the maximum amount of financial recovery that you are entitled to.

 

One of the most important parts of a San Diego personal injury settlement is confidentiality. You should work with your San Diego attorney to make sure that your case information is kept confidential. It is extremely important that you work with a reputable and honest San Diego personal injury settlement attorney and that he or she aggressively obtain all of the documentation and information that are required for your settlement. Only through cooperation will you achieve the highest level of settlement possible.

Categories
Elizabeth Denham

Going Unnoticed

 

Last week, I came across an interview with Elizabeth Denham on a Canadian website called The Walrus that was published in April. There are some interesting nuggets – Denham seems to out herself as a Remainer in the third paragraph (a tad awkward given that she has only enforced on the other side) and also it turns out that the Commissioner has framed pictures of herself taking on Facebook in her office. More important is the comparison she draws between her Canadian jobs and her current role: “That’s why I like being where I am now,” she says, settling herself at a boardroom table. “To actually see people prosecuted.”

Denham probably wasn’t thinking of the run of legitimate but low-key prosecutions of nosy admin staff and practice managers which her office has carried out in recent months, which means she was up to her old tricks of inaccurately using the language of crime and prosecution to describe powers that are civil (or more properly, administrative). Since GDPR came in, she’s even less likely to prosecute than before, given that she no longer has the power to do so for an ignored enforcement or information notice. I don’t know whether she genuinely doesn’t understand how her powers work or is just using the wrong words because she thinks it makes for a better quote.

Publicity certainly plays a far greater part in the ICO’s enforcement approach than it should. A few months back, I made an FOI request to the ICO asking about a variety of enforcement issues and the information I received was fascinating. The response was late (because of course it was), but it was very thorough and detailed, and what it reveals is significant.

ICO enforcement breaks down into two main types. Enforcement notices are used where the ICO wants to stop unlawful practices or otherwise put things right. Monetary penalties are a punishment for serious breaches. Occasionally, they are used together, but often the bruised organisation is willing to go along with whatever the ICO wants, or has already put things right, so an enforcement notice is superfluous. The ICO is obliged to serve a notice of intent (NOI) in advance of a final penalty notice, giving the controller the opportunity to make representations. There is no equivalent requirement for preliminary enforcement notices, but in virtually every case, the ICO serves a preliminary notice anyway, also allowing for representations.

According to my FOI response, in 2017, the ICO issued 8 preliminary enforcement notices (PENs), but only 4 were followed up by a final enforcement notice; in 2018, 5 PENs were issued, and only 3 resulted in a final notice. The ratio of NOIs to final penalties is much closer; in 2017, there were 19 NOIs, and only one was not followed up with a penalty. In 2018, 21 NOIs were issued, 20 of which resulted in a penalty. Nevertheless, the PEN / NOI stage is clearly meaningful. In multiple cases, whatever the controller said stopped the intended enforcement in its tracks. In the light of many GDPR ‘experts’ confusion about when fines are real or proposed, the fact that not every NOI results in a fine is worth noting.

The response shows the risks of neglecting to issue a PEN. In July 2018, the ICO issued Aggregate IQ (AKA AIQ) with the first GDPR enforcement notice (indeed, it was the first GDPR enforcement action altogether). My FOI reveals that it was one of only a few cases where a preliminary notice was not issued. The AIQ EN was unenforceable, ordering them to cease processing any personal data about any UK or EU “citizens” obtained from UK political organisations “or otherwise for the purposes of data analytics, political campaigning or any other advertising purposes”. AIQ was forbidden from ever holding personal data about any EU citizen for any advertising purpose, even if that purpose was entirely lawful, and despite the fact that the GDPR applies to residents, not citizens. AIQ appealed, but before that appeal could be heard, the ICO capitulated and replaced the notice with one that required AIQ to delete a specific dataset, and only after the conclusion of an investigation in Canada. It cannot be a coincidence that this badly written notice was published as part of the launch of the ICO’s first report into Data Analytics. It seems that ICO rushed it, ignoring the normal procedure, so that the Commissioner had things to announce.

The ICO confirmed to me that it hasn’t served a penalty without an NOI, which is as it should be, but the importance of the NOI stage is underlined by another case announced with the first AIQ EN. The ICO issued a £500,000 penalty against Facebook, except that what was announced in July 2018 was the NOI, rather than the final penalty. Between July and October, the ICO would have received representations from Facebook, and as a result, the story in the final penalty was changed. The NOI claims that a million UK Facebook users’ data was passed to Cambridge Analytica and SCL among others for political purposes, but the final notice acknowledges that the ICO has no evidence that any UK users data was used for campaigning. As an aside, this means that ICO has no evidence Cambridge Analytica used Facebook data in the Brexit referendum. The final notice is based on a hypothetical yarn about the risk of a US visitor’s data being processed while passing through the UK, and an assertion that even though UK Facebook users’ data wasn’t abused for political purposes (the risk did not “eventuate“), it could have been, so there. I’ve spent years emphasising that the incident isn’t the same as a breach, but going for the maximum penalty on something that didn’t happen, having said previously that it did, is perhaps the wrong time to listen to me.

If you haven’t read the final Facebook notice, you really should. ICO’s argument is that UK users data could have been abused for political purposes even though it wasn’t, and the mere possibility would cause people substantial distress. I find this hard to swallow. I suspect ICO felt they had effectively announced the £500,000 penalty; most journalists reported the NOI as such. Despite Facebook’s representations pulling the rug out from under the NOI, I guess that the ICO couldn’t back down. There had to be a £500,000 penalty, so they worked backwards from there. The Commissioner now faces an appeal on a thin premise, as well as accusations from Facebook that Denham was biased when making her decision.

Had the NOI not been published (like virtually every other NOI for the past ten years), the pressure of headlines would have been absent. Facebook have already made the not unreasonable point in the Tribunal that as the final penalty has a different premise than the NOI, the process is unfair. Without a public NOI, Facebook could have put this to the ICO behind closed doors, and an amended NOI could have been issued with no loss of face. If Facebook’s representations were sufficiently robust, the case could have been dropped altogether, as happened in other cases in both 2017 and 2018. For the sake of a few days’ headlines, Denham would not be facing the possibility of a career-defining humiliation at the hands of Facebook of all people, maybe even having to pay their costs. It’s not like there aren’t a dozen legitimate cases to be made against Facebook’s handling of personal data, but this is the hill the ICO has chosen to die on. Maybe I’m wrong and Facebook will lose their appeal, but imagine if they win and this farrago helps them to get there.

The other revelation in my FOI response is an area of enforcement that the ICO does not want to publicise at all. In 2016, the ICO issued a penalty on an unnamed historical society, and in 2017, another was served on an unnamed barrister. I know this because the ICO published the details, publicly confirming the nature of the breach, amount of the penalty as well as the type of organisation. One might argue that they set a precedent in doing so. What I didn’t know until this FOI request is that there have been a further 3 secret monetary penalties, 1 in 2017 and 2 in 2018. The details have not been published, and the ICO refused to give me any information about them now.

The exemptions set out the ICO’s concerns. They claim that it might be possible for me to identify individual data subjects, even though both the barrister and historical society breaches involved very limited numbers of people but were still published. They also claim that disclosure will prejudice their ability to enforce Data Protection law, using this justification:

“We are relying on this exemption to withhold information from you where the disclosure of that information is held for an ongoing regulatory process (so, we are yet to complete our regulatory process and our intentions could still be affected by the actions of a data controller) or the information is held in relation to sensitive matters and its disclosure would adversely affect relationships which we need to maintain with the organisations involved. It is essential that organisations continue to engage with us in a constructive and collaborative way without fear that the information they provide to us will be made public prematurely, or at a later date, if it is inappropriate to do so. Disclosure of the withheld information at this time would therefore be likely to prejudice our ability to effectively carry out our regulatory function”

The ICO routinely releases the names of data controllers she has served monetary penalties and enforcement notices on without any fears about the damage to their relationship. Just last week, she was expressing how “deeply concerned” she is about the use of facial recognition by the private sector, despite being at the very beginning of her enquiries into one such company. And if maintaining working relationships at the expense of transparency is such a vital principle, how can they justify the publication of the Facebook NOI for no more lofty reason than to sex up the release of the analytics report? They say “It is essential that organisations continue to engage with us in a constructive and collaborative way without fear that the information they provide to us will be made public prematurely”, and yet the Facebook NOI was published prematurely despite the fact that it was a dud. What will that have done to the ICO’s relationship with a controller as influential and significant as Facebook? What incentive do FB have to work with Wilmslow in a constructive and collaborative way now? And if identifying the subjects is an issue, what is to stop the ICO from saying ‘we fined X organisation £100,000’ but refusing to say why, or alternatively, describing the incident but anonymising the controller?

It doesn’t make sense to publicise enforcement when it’s not finished, and it doesn’t make sense to keep it secret when it’s done. Every controller that has been named and shamed by the ICO should be demanding to know why these penalties have been kept secret, while Facebook have every right to demand that the Commissioner account for the perverse and ill-judged way in which she took action against them. Meanwhile, we should all ask why the information rights regulator is in such a mess.

And one final question: did she bring the framed pictures with her or did we pay to get them done?

Categories
Elizabeth Denham

Taking the piss

 

On page 74 of the Information Commissioner’s newly published Annual Report, you can find the welcome news that the ICO reduced the amount of water in flushing toilets and the timings of auto flushing in urinals. Sadly, the expansion of the organisation’s footprint in Wilmslow, due to swelling numbers of staff, has led to an increase in overall emissions (insert your own joke). There is an abundance of other information about other environmental issues, including paper consumption and car journeys,

Strangely, if you look for information about one of the landmark events of UK Data Protection in 2019 – 2020, there is no sign. In December 2019, the Information Commissioner issued its first ever penalty under the General Data Protection Regulation against a company called Doorstep Dispensaree. Several pages of the report are taken up illustrating “The Year in Summary”, and the only thing mentioned for December is the launch of a consultation about AI. It’s not that the ICO had so many things to report on; one of the highlights for June 2019 was “The Information Commissioner makes a speech at a G20 side event in Tokyo“. Odd that an event which is very much the ‘only invited to the evening do’ of international speaking gigs makes the cut, but the first and so far only UK GDPR fine does not.

There are several reasons for this, I believe, all of which go to the heart of what is wrong with Elizabeth Denham’s disastrous term as Commissioner. The first is Denham’s vanity, mistaking public appearances and headlines for actual achievements. Allied to her Kim Jong Un tendencies is the prioritisation of international work and pet projects over the basics of regulation. Finally, there is a fundamental dishonesty at play – it should be deeply embarrassing for Denham that she hasn’t made a serious attempt to enforce the GDPR in two years. Because it is evidence of this failure, Doorstep Dispensaree (a solid and encouragingly detailed enforcement case that should have been the ICO’s bread and butter during this period) is written out of the story. It didn’t happen.

Most of the report is a soup of meaningless buzzphrases, presumably designed to disguise the hollow nature of what is being described. There have been “deep dive sessions” with the “most significant Digital Economy Stakeholders“, an “Innovation Listening Tour” and an “Innovation Hub”, which the ICO hopes to open up to “innovative organisations” like “catapults” and “incubators“. I think all of this that they’ve had lots of meetings; the outcomes are impossible to identify beyond wonderful “engagement“, a word which appears 22 times (‘penalty‘ appears 4 times).

It is possible to identify a couple of interesting themes. One is the ICO’s determination to support capitalism and The Man. One of the main strategic goals is “enabling innovation and economic growth“, while another is increasing trust and confidence in the way personal data is used. These are not regulatory outcomes, they are economic goals. Actual enforcement of the law is demoted to the fifth out of six goals. The ICO has established a team of people to work on the economic growth agenda, led by a Head of Economic Analysis seconded from an organisation that Wilmslow has decided we don’t need to know the name of.

The other obvious strand is both depressing and familiar, especially to an ICO refugee of such ancient vintage as myself. The joke in the ICO when I was there (2001 – 2002, fact fans) was that it didn’t matter that we never took action because “thinking is doing”, a phrase attributed to Francis Aldhouse, the Deputy Commissioner at the time. Thinking is Doing paralysed the ICO for years, but the spell was broken first by the impossibility of ignoring the cycle of security breaches begun by HMRC’s lost discs, and then by Chris Graham. For all his flaws, Graham revolutionised the ICO by allowing his staff to demolish the shameful FOI backlog and embrace the penalty powers that the lost discs fiasco gifted to Wilmslow.

Thinking is Doing is back. Doorstep Dispensaree (a thing that happened) doesn’t warrant a mention, but the BA and Marriott penalties (things that did not happen) are mentioned approvingly because they “received a large amount of media attention

One of the case studies in the Annual Report covers the ICO’s investigation into Ad Tech. After a flurry of meetings, press releases and agreeable dinners at Cibo, the ICO was supposedly poised to rewrite the internet, but instead, the Executive Director of Shiny Things Simon McDougall promised that whatever they did, ICO would not to spoil the ad industry’s Christmas. Then, when Covid-19 gave him cover, he dropped the whole thing like a stone. McDougall is paid between £115,000 and £120,000 per year, and his contract has been renewed until July 2021, for reasons I cannot begin to understand.

The closer that the report gets to reality rather than Denham’s preoccupations with politics and online harms, the harder it gets to spare her blushes. The report cites 236 instances of “regulatory action“, but it’s really hard to work out what this means. Of that total, just 15 are fines, 7 are enforcement notices, and 8 are assessment notices (i.e. mandatory audits). There are 8 prosecutions and 4 cautions. 54 of the “regulatory actions” are in fact information notices, which do not represent action at all.

An Information Notice is an investigatory tool which might led to action, and might not; in itself, it’s just demanding information. What are the other 139 “regulatory actions“, and why doesn’t the Commissioner what to admit what they are? Has there been a blizzard of warnings and reprimands that are being kept secret? Or, as the inclusion of information notices denotes, is the maths necessary to create the 236 more akin to gymnastics?

The report boasts of ICO intervention in a number of court cases, and happily sets out their successful involvement in the Elgizouli case. It’s a sign of how thin-skinned Denham’s ICO has become that they can’t bring themselves to admit that in the other two cases they cite (the challenges to South Wales Police’s use of facial recognition and the DPA’s immigration exemption), they backed the losing side.

In the end, the figures don’t lie. The toilet flush numbers are encouraging, but other information is less reassuring. The ICO set itself a target of resolving (i.e. closing) 80% of complaints within 12 weeks. Despite receiving less complaints than in the previous year, gaining 100 staff and receiving a massive boost in funding, they managed only 74%. 84 cases are more than a year old. Despite 46% of complaints received being about subject access, the ICO took no enforcement action against subject access infringements in the period.

Perhaps most damning of all, the total number of fines issued in the period (£2,409,000) was less than half what it was in 2018 – 2019 (£5,436,000). There are people who praise the ICO for their guidance and conference appearances, but this is like measuring the police for their road safety demonstrations in schools. The ICO isn’t a “proportionate and practical regulator” – it’s far from where it should be, achieving nothing but emissions of hot air.

Denham’s foreword has an almost valedictory tone. There’s a strong effort to defend the ICO’s determination to spend time on anything as long as it isn’t related to the UK, but the final thought is about how Denham thinks she has achieved her objective of transforming the ICO into “an information rights regulator that is helpful, authoritative, tech-savvy, practical and firm“. While what she’s actually done is hollowed out a passable regulator and turned it into an ineffective, politically biased think-tank, the only positive thing I can take away from this annual report is the hope that if Denham thinks it’s mission accomplished, she will move on to pastures new. Hopefully her successor will have some experience at putting out fires.

Categories
EIRs

Goodbye Silver Service, Say Hello to Lead

 

The Information Commissioner has two powers to make FOI and the EIRs work, and a backup power to facilitate the other two. They’re found in FOI but apply to both. Under Section 50, the Commissioner can resolve a complaint about an individual FOI / EIR complaint by issuing a Decision Notice, which determines whether the public authority’s response was partially or wholly right or wrong. Under Section 52, the Information Commissioner can issue an Enforcement Notice, which allows the ICO to order a public authority to put right any failing, and unlike S50 is not linked to an individual complaint. Logically, the Enforcement Notice makes sense as a tool to deal with consistent or corporate FOI failings, as anything identified during an individual complaint can be resolved in a Decision Notice. As regular readers will know, the Enforcement Notice exists in name only as the Commissioner has not issued one since 2010 and seems effectively to have retired it.

In the middle is the S51 Information Notice, which is more specific. Most FOI / EIR complaints are resolved through protracted but willing correspondence, but occasionally an organisation won’t play along and so S51 allows the Commissioner to demand information. It’s a powerful tool, but it’s not an end in itself. “If the Commissioner reasonably requires information“, the Information Notice does the job. This usually happens when a recalcitrant organisation has already been asked for information and either fails to or refuses to supply it. One of the tantalising things about the Information Notice is that it refers to recorded and unrecorded information – the ICO can demand an explanation of what has gone on even if such an explanation has not been written down. But that’s for another time.

Last month, the Information Commissioner published a decision notice about an EIR request to Hackney Council. The applicant wanted to see what turned out to be a lot of information about the planning application for a Free School. Hackney’s handling of the request was – to say the least – inelegant, and I apologise in advance for the way in which I will linger on the case in every EIR training course I run for Act Now Training over the next few years. It’s one of those ‘What Not To Do’ situations. After some delay (Hackney) and hand-wringing (the ICO), Hackney settled on the decision that the request was manifestly unreasonable, and the ICO gave Hackney a deadline to communicate this decision to the applicant. The Decision Notice explains what happened next:

The Council failed to respond within this deadline and so the Commissioner issued an information notice under section 51 of the FOIA. This obliged the Council to write to the complainant specifying that, if this was now its position, regulation 12(4)(b) was believed to apply, and to write to the ICO with a full explanation of its reasoning for the citing of that exceptionIn line with the information notice the Council wrote to the complainant on 16 August 2013 and advised him that the Council now relied on regulation 12(4)(b) on account of the time and cost of complying with these requests”. Remarkably, or as the ICO would have it “Regrettably“, the ICO had to chase Hackney for the required explanation.

This is not the usual ICO dithering. This is far worse than that. The Information Commissioner cannot use an Information Notice to require a public authority to do anything except provide it with information. The Commissioner could order Hackney to answer the request, but only by using a Decision Notice under Section 50. Moreover, if the ICO describes the situation accurately, Hackney apparently breached the bit of the Information Notice that might have been valid (the requirement to explain why they thought 12(4)(b) applied), but the ICO did nothing about it other than ‘chasing’. If taken before a judge, a breach of an Information Notice is treated as a contempt of court.

You may be sitting there thinking that this is a molehill. Big deal, you might say. They cited the wrong bit of the legislation. They didn’t follow up on the exercise of their powers. At length, they made a decision and have now ordered Hackney to disclose the information to the applicant. Job done. If that’s what you’re thinking, you’re wrong.

The Information Commissioner’s Decision Notice seems to say that it exercised its powers in an unlawful way. They have announced that even when they use their interim enforcement powers (however incompetently), they will not follow through on it and will limply ‘chase’ rather than prosecute. No aspect of the ICO’s enforcement is entirely successful. The Commissioner has suffered reverses on both Data Protection and PECR enforcement recently. Data Protection enforcement is unfairly skewed towards public sector security and is based too much on unproven assumptions about identity theft and a fixation with the incident, not the underlying breach. But the Commissioner’s reverses on DP and PECR are matters of interpretation, not basic competence – neither recent Tribunal loss was tossed out. The ICO’s antics on the Hackney case suggest that people working on FOI either don’t know how their powers work, or they don’t care.

The best case scenario for the ICO is that somehow, the author of the notice has explained what they did so badly that some kind of strong message to Hackney to answer the request has been conflated with the Information Notice. They could have done it properly but made it sound like they didn’t. But it’s hard to imagine how this is possible when language as concrete as this is used: the Information Notice “obliged the Council to write to the complainant” and Hackney’s response to the applicant was “in line with the Notice“.

The final decision – where the Council was ordered to disclose using S50 – was signed off by a senior manager who, if they didn’t actually write the notice presumably read it and saw no problem with the misuse of the Information Notice it described. Even if the author was deluded, the Group Manager must surely know what an Information Notice is for, and could have cleared up the misunderstanding. Indeed, the notice even comes with the dreaded sanctimonious ‘Other matters’ section where the cock-up is warmed over again. They couldn’t have missed it.

While many ICO decisions sail through clumsily but probably get the right result, the inability to make enforcement decisions against big targets like the Cabinet Office and the Department for Education, and the inability to enforce lawfully against anyone make me think that FOI within the Information Commissioner’s office is broken. They’re so unwilling to enforce, they now don’t actually know how to. Chris Graham has clearly shown a willingness to take enforcement action on DP and PECR, but FOI continues to be a rolling embarrassment, threatening to bring his office into disrepute. Either he sorts this mess out, or he should give FOI up and let someone else do it properly instead.

Categories
DPO

Lateral Thinking

 

Last week, I wrote a blog about the ‘personal data agency’ Yo-Da, outlining my concerns about their grandiose claims, the lack of detail about how their service works and their hypocritical decision to ignore a subject access request I made to them. Predictably, this led to further online tussles between myself and Benjamin Falk, the company’s founder and ‘chief talker’. As a result of our final conversation, Yo-Da has effectively disappeared from the internet. Clearly, I touched a nerve.

Yo-Da’s website made concrete claims about what their service did, and in fact had done. There were testimonials from satisfied users, and three case studies. Although it was clear that the service wasn’t operating yet, the testimonials were unambiguous: here is what Yo-Da has done for me. There was no hint that they were fictional, nothing to suggest that the service couldn’t do what the site said.

Yo-Da systematically and automatically exercises your data rights

+

Use Yo-Da to ask any company in Europe to delete your personal information

User ‘Samuel’ claimed “Now I go to Yo-Da, search for the company whose (sic) been breached, and with 1-click find out what is happening with my personal information”, while ‘Nathan’ said “Yo-Da was simple to use and helped me understand just how many businesses in Europe have my data.

None of this is true. Yo-Da do not have a working product that does these things. As Falk put it to me “Our technology is still under development” and “We have some ideas that are working. They aren’t perfect.” I am not saying that Yo-Da aren’t developing an automated data rights service; I’m certain that they are. I’m not saying a product will never launch; I expect that it will and I am looking forward to it, though perhaps not for the same reason as Samuel and Nathan. The point is, it doesn’t exist now and the website said that it did.

Originally, Falk claimed that he had deliberately ignored my subject access request because it was unfounded. ‘Unpleasant’ people like me don’t have data rights, he claimed. This didn’t sound right, especially as after I published my blog, Yo-Da’s DPO (Trilateral Research) suddenly woke up and tried to process my request, as if this was the first they’d heard of it. During our correspondence, they made it clear that they agreed with Falk’s decision that my request was unfounded, but were silent on the decision to ignore it.

But in my argument with Falk, he admitted the truth “We have an outsourced DPO for a reason; we can’t afford a full time one. That’s why the SAR went ignored; our service isn’t live yet and so we didn’t expect to receive any requests, because we aren’t collecting any personal data on anyone

In a single tweet, Falk said a lot. He was admitting that all of the testimonials and case studies were fake (he ultimately said to me that they were “obviously fake”). At the same time, he was also not telling the truth. Falk said that the website was a “dummy” to “gauge interest”. In other words, the site exists as an advert for a theoretical service, but its other purpose is to persuade people to sign up to Yo-Da’s mailing list. It was designed to collect personal data. Yo-Da were saying ‘sign up with us to use this service that actually works’. I believe that this is a direct breach of the first GDPR principle on fairness and transparency. I want to know why Trilateral Research acted as a DPO for an organisation that did this.

Falk said that he was joking when he said that he ignored my request on purpose, but Trilateral didn’t acknowledge that. They wrote of a ‘delay’ in acknowledging my request, but concurred with Falk’s unfounded decision. That decision was never made; my SAR was just missed. Nobody was checking the ‘dpo@yo-da.co’ email account – Falk wasn’t, and neither were they, despite being the putative DPO. Either they didn’t know what had happened, or they didn’t care. They definitely backed up their client rather than digging into why a SAR had been received and ignored on spurious grounds without their involvement. Let’s be generous and assume that they didn’t know that Falk was bullshitting. Their client had taken a controversial and disputable decision in a SAR case, and he hadn’t consulted them before he did it, but they didn’t acknowledge that. They backed the unfounded refusal.

Even if Yo-Da one day launches a product that successfully facilitates automated data rights requests to every company in Europe (prediction: this will never happen), they definitely don’t have that product now, and their website claimed that they did. Either Trilateral didn’t know that this is the case, which means that they failed to do basic due diligence on their client, or they knew that the Yo-Da website was soliciting personal data on the basis of false claims.

When I pointed out to Falk that all of the sign-up data had been collected unlawfully (it’s not fair and transparent to gather data about a service that doesn’t exist), the conversation ended. The Yo-Da website instantly vanished, and their Twitter account was deactivated minutes later. I’m certain that Falk will be back, his little spat with me considered to be no more than a bump in the road to world domination. But forget him; what does this say about Trilateral? The best defence I can think of is that they took Falk’s money to be in-name-only DPO but didn’t scrutinise the company or their claims. This is bad. If they had any idea that Yo-Da doesn’t currently do what the website claimed, it’s worse.

According to the European Data Protection Board, the professional qualities that must be demonstrated by a Data Protection Officer include “integrity and high professional ethics”. I seriously question whether Trilateral have demonstrated integrity and high professional ethics in this case. It’s plainly unethical to be named as DPO for an organisation, and then ignore what comes into the DPO email address. Article 38(4) of the GDPR states “Data subjects may contact the data protection officer with regard to all issues related to processing of their personal data and to the exercise of their rights under this Regulation” but Trilateral weren’t even listening. It’s unethical to take on a client without knowing in detail how their services work (or even whether their services work), and that’s the only defence I can see in this case. It’s unethical to be DPO for an organisation that is making false or exaggerated claims to obtain personal data.

I regularly get asked by clients if I can recommend an outsourced DPO or a company who can do the kind of sustained consultancy work that a solo operator like me doesn’t have the capacity for. There are a few names I’m happy to give. I have no hesitation in saying that on the basis of this shoddy episode, I wouldn’t touch Trilateral Research with a bargepole.

Categories
DPO

Role playing

 

A few weeks ago, the Data Protection world was shaken by a decision from the Belgian DP Authority to fine an organisation €50,000 after they appointed their Head of the Compliance, Risk Management and Audit department as their Data Protection Officer. I’ve commented before about my frustration that too many organisations are unable to comprehend the independence and relative freedom of the DPO role as anything other than a senior-level job – in such places, the role is a DPOINO, a Data Protection Officer In Name Only, with a younger, more junior but much more expert person actually carrying out the role. The DPOINO in these organisations is usually a middle-aged white man, and the real DPO is a younger woman. I imagine you are shocked to read this.

The Belgian decision is not ridiculous – it is difficult for someone in a senior position to escape decisions about hiring and firing (for example) or system design, activities that risk dragging the incumbent into determining the purposes. If the DPO was less senior, even in the same department, the risk of conflicts of interests would be lower. There are better, more imaginative models, but I think seniority is always fatal. Needless to say, some commentators have drawn more other conclusions.

Writing for Scottish Housing News, Daradjeet Jagpal questioned whether it was time for his audience (Registered Social Landlords in Scotland) to review their DPO appointments. Despite this being a single case in a foreign jurisdiction with tenuous direct application to a non-EU country like the UK, Jagpal fell back on the consistency mechanism, and warned his readers that the ICO might adopt the same approach, skipping over the fact that Wilmslow’s approach to the GDPR has been to go to sleep. A quick survey of the possible candidates – mainly heads of various RSL departments – do not make the grade for Jagpal, and rather patronisingly, he dismisses the idea that a Corporate Services Officer would be “comfortable or sufficiently confident to challenge the CEO on non-compliance“. Take that, many DPOs who I know and love.

Jagpal comes to the conclusion that “The obvious solution is for RSLs to appoint an external DPO” which is remarkable, given that Jagpal is described in the article as “a leading provider of outsourced DPO services to RSLs across Scotland“. I’m not suggesting that he’s is over-egging the Belgian decision for nakedly commercial purposes, but he does place weirdly heavy emphasis on EU standards and pressures which are clearly either dead or dying for Brexit Britain, and he barely entertains the idea that Scottish RSLs might just appoint a DPO in-house.

To be fair, the Belgian decision is a real thing that happened, and while I disagree with Jagpal’s assessment of its implications, he’s accurately described the situation. The same cannot be said of everyone in the outsourced DPO sector. In a webinar hosted by everyone’s favourite LinkedIn spammers, Data Protection World Forum, the CEO of The DPO Centre, Rob Masson decided to get creative. Masson spoke of the “quite strict guidelines” (AKA legal requirements) about who can be a DPO and the importance of avoiding conflicts of interest. He went on to say “we’ve got to remember that the role of the Data Protection Officer is to represent the needs of the Data Subjects. It’s not necessarily to represent the needs of the organisation.”

None of the specified DPO tasks refer to data subjects. They require a DPO to advise the organisation on data protection matters, monitor its compliance with the GDPR and other laws, advise on and monitor the effectiveness of data protection impact assessments, and liaise with the Information Commissioner’s Office. If you wanted to be exceptionally generous to Masson, you could interpret the whole of the GDPR as reflecting the needs of data subjects to have their personal data properly regulated, and from there spin the DPO’s role as a facilitator of that. But that’s also nonsense. It’s as much in the interests of an organisation that the personal data they use is accurate and secure as it is for data subjects. The GDPR sometimes allows controllers to retain data despite a subject’s objection, to keep processing secret from them when it might prejudice certain purposes, and to balance their own wish to use data against the impact on the subject, deciding to use it without consent when they think they’ve assessed the situation properly.

If we’re talking about the needs of the organisation, I’d argue that most of the GDPR’s requirements reflect the needs of the controller. Some organisations are too lazy or stupid to see it, or they’re getting advice from the wrong people. It might seem like disposing of personal data that you genuinely don’t need any more is an unwelcome imposition, but it’s very much the healthy option. To use Masson’s own word, GDPR is the spinach that the organisation *needs*, even if it might prefer the Big Mac and Fries of not thinking about it.

A77 gives the subject the “right” to lodge a complaint with the relevant supervisory authority. A39(1)(a) says that the DPO “shall” inform and advise the organisation of their obligations. Contrast these provisions with the words in A38(4), the only element of the DPO articles that refers to subjects: “Data subjects may contact the data protection officer with regard to all issues related to processing of their personal data and to the exercise of their rights under this Regulation.” This obviously means that the DPO ought to be accessible to data subjects (one of my objections to senior DPOs is that they won’t go for this), but it also shows Masson’s version to be fantasy. There is no right to reply, no hint that the DPO is the subject’s advocate or representative. They’re at best a conduit for concerned subjects.

Obviously, the DPO isn’t just the loyal servant of the organisation, and they have to reconcile being an employee and an independent advisor. I disagree with Jagpal’s dismissal of junior officers as being capable of standing up to CEOs because I know so many who do it regularly. But he’s reflecting a real problem that many DPOs face. If the senior people don’t want to take the DPO’s advice, they are in an invidious position. Until the ICO shows that it is willing to back DPOs in these kinds of situations, it’s going to remain a precarious and stressful job for those facing unsympathetic management. Masson’s characterisation can only make this worse, feeding a perception that the DPO is not even there to help the business, but to pursue the interests of data subjects. Subjects come in all shapes and sizes, but some of them are hostile, difficult and aggressive, and telling a CEO who already doesn’t take data protection seriously that their DPO represents these people’s interests is toxic. This snake-oil may seem slick on a bullshit webinar, but if this unhelpful message reaches workplaces with already unsympathetic management, it’s going to make the work of beleaguered DPOs even harder.

I wonder if it’s a coincidence that Masson’s misreading of the GDPR could benefit his business – if the DPO really is there to serve the needs of the data subject, doesn’t an external figure make more sense than an in-house officer who won’t be doing what you want them to do anyway? There’s nothing in the GDPR that would make you think that this version of the DPO is correct, so it has to come from somewhere. If that’s it, rather than simple ignorance, I wonder if Masson has the guts to try to hawk this stuff in a forum where people might actually challenge him.

At this point, you might be thinking, so what? People talk shite to get business. They predict SARmageddons. They shout about 4% of annual turnover fines. They claim that first-tier decisions in Belgium should make you change your DPO.  Does it matter? Doesn’t every sector have its share of hype and froth? The answer is that I have to work in this one, and I think the truth matters. I also have to clean up other people’s bullshit. I have to overcome the hype and the scaremongering spread around by the other people in my industry. I know the popular mantra is that commercial folk should all be pitching in and helping each other, but by spreading misinformation, the likes of Rob Masson are already not doing that, so why should I?

The Information Commissioner’s Office isn’t going to enforce against organisations with an imperfect DPO choice – perhaps they should, but they won’t. They’ve done one GDPR fine in two years and I doubt we’ll see another one in 2020. Sidelined by government in the coronacrisis, facing a review from the DCMS (pointedly not postponed despite the pandemic) and humiliated by the collapse of multiple high profile actions, the ICO is an irrelevance. I’ll be surprised if they survive in their current form. The reason to choose the right DPO is that an independent, challenging person in the role will help organisations to make intelligent decisions that will build a culture of more secure, more accurate, more effectively used data. The DPO isn’t the voice of the subjects, they’re a valuable asset there to guide and assist the organisation. I won’t sell a single course place by saying so, but that doesn’t make it any less true.

Categories
DPA

Unambiguously yours

 

There’s an old joke about a tourist in Ireland asking for directions and getting the reply ‘If I was you, I wouldn’t start from here’. To anyone in the position of wondering whether to contact all of the people on their mailing list to get GDPR-standard consent to send marketing, fund-raising or promotional emails and texts, I can only say this: I wouldn’t start from here.

With apologies to regular readers who already know (there must be six of you by now), the problem comes because most of the people advising on the solution don’t seem to know what the problem is. They think that the General Data Protection Regulation makes a significant change to the nature of consent from what is required now, and so they tell their clients and employers that there is an urgent need to carry out a ‘re-consenting’ exercise. A memo has clearly gone out – a distinguished correspondent has sent me two examples of organisations sending out emails to get consent in the past week, and yesterday, the charity Stonewall used Valentine’s Day as a prompt to beg its supporters to ‘not leave us this way’. It was lovely, and it is probably an admission that Stonewall have been acting unlawfully since at least 2003, if not 1998.

Here’s the problem. The 1995 Data Protection Directive defines consent like this:

any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed

and

the data subject has unambiguously given his consent

If you’re new to this, read those sentences a few times. Think about ‘freely given’. Think about the consent being an ‘indication’, something by which the person ‘signifies’ their ‘agreement’. Think about ‘unambiguously given‘. If you think that this be interpreted as an opt-out, where are your car keys? Consent, according to you, is me taking your car keys and leaving you a legalistic note somewhere that says that unless you tell me not to borrow your car, I can borrow your car. Or because I borrowed it another time and you didn’t object, I can keep borrowing your car until you tell me not to.

This is nonsense. Consent cannot be inferred. It cannot be implied. A badly written opt-out buried in terms and conditions, consent assumed because I made a donation, the fact that you have my email address and you assume that I must have given it to you with my consent for marketing rather than (for example) you bought it from a list broker who launders dodgy data like drug money – none of these examples constitute consent. Consent is consent. You asked and I said yes. We all know what it means and to pretend otherwise is to lie so you can persuade yourself that you can spam people.

Yes, the GDPR adds a couple of things. It requires consent to be ‘demonstrable’. It states explicitly that consent can only be obtained by a ‘statement or by a clear affirmative action’. But if you claim that the absence of the above phrase in the Directive is any help to the opt-out model, you’re lying to yourself. An opt-out is inherently ambiguous, and the directive says that consent cannot be unambiguous. I might have misunderstood the wording (especially if the language was clunky or technical, which it often is), the data may have been obtained for a different purpose and the consent option is buried in terms and conditions, I might just have missed it or forgotten. The Directive is clear.

Jump ahead to the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations, based on Directive 2002/58/EC (often known the ePrivacy Directive). The definition of consent comes from the Data Protection Directive, and so if the ePrivacy Directive says you need consent, what you need is unambiguous, freely given, specific and informed consent. The ePrivacy Directive is enacted by the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, or PECR (which all good people pronounce as ‘Pecker’ and revel in the opportunities that doing so affords them).

PECR makes life even harder for the opt-outers. For emails, PECR says that the recipient must have “previously notified the sender that he consents for the time being to such communications being sent by, or at the instigation of, the sender“. If you think that a person can ‘notify’ you by not doing something (i.e. not opting-out), once again, where are your car keys?

Surprisingly given all the execrable practice to which the Commissioner happily turns a blind eye, Wilmslow fired a shot across everyone’s bows with three enforcement cases last year. Morrisons and Flybe are to some extent red herrings as they deliberately targeted people who had explicitly opted out of receiving direct marketing, so when the companies emailed them asking them to opt back in, it was plainly bullshit. The Honda case is more interesting, in the sense that Honda ignored everyone who had opted in (because they’d opted in) and everyone who had opted out (naturally). They contacted people where they didn’t know either way, where they held no evidence of consent. Despite the fact that in all three cases, the contact itself wasn’t selling anything, all were sent for marketing purposes, and here, the ICO argued that the organisations didn’t have consent for sending emails for marketing purposes. It’s been argued by idiots that all Honda were trying to do was comply with GDPR, but that’s patently false. They were trying to pack out their marketing list before a perceived change in the law (GDPR) while ignoring another law that was just fine thanks (PECR).

And now we come to the payoff. If Stonewall (and all the others) have consent to send fund-raising emails, they don’t need to ask again. If they don’t have freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous consent, they shouldn’t be sending emails for marketing purposes now, even if the purpose is to ask for consent from people who are happy to give it because the email is inherently unlawful. It wouldn’t be unlawful for Stonewall to write to all of its supporters and ask them for consent, because post isn’t electronic so PECR doesn’t apply. I would say that there is plainly a legitimate interest for them to use post to ask people for permission to send fund-raising and promotional correspondence by email, so there is no GDPR problem.

The problem with a re-consenting exercise is that the organisation is basically admitting to a PECR breach. The problem is exacerbated by doing that re-consenting exercise by email, because as Honda have demonstrated, doing so is in itself a breach of PECR. People complained to the ICO about the Honda emails, which is why they enforced. If you do a re-consenting exercise by email, anyone irritated enough by the request may well complain. Then what?

So what do I think organisations should do in the light of all this? Well, I wouldn’t start from here. But ignoring the law for a moment, this might be a time to be pragmatic. If you send people content that they want and you don’t annoy them (email being less annoying and distracting than phone or text in my opinion), if you have nice big bright unsubscribe buttons, and if YOU RESPECT BLOODY UNSUBSCRIBE REQUESTS (Hello Daily Telegraph), what’s the risk? Why draw attention to yourself?

I am convinced that sending emails to people who haven’t opted-in is unlawful unless you’ve got the soft opt-in (which because it’s predicated on data gathered through a sale, most charities won’t have). But many organisations have been content to do that for years despite it being unlawful now. So what’s actually changing? I think everyone should comply with the law because privacy – the right to be left alone – is a vital foundation for a civilised society. But if you’re sitting on a mailing list and you’re not sure what to do with it, I would forgive you if you took a slower, longer path, taking every natural opportunity to get renewed consent from existing contacts, getting strong unambiguous consent from anyone new, and hoping that churn and natural wastage gets you where you need to be. And if you’re wrestling with this right now and you’ve read this far, good luck and best wishes.

Categories
DPA

Head in the Sandbox

 

The Information Commissioner’s Office recently held a workshop about their proposed Regulatory Sandbox. The idea of the sandbox is that organisations can come to the ICO with new proposals in order to test out their lawfulness in a safe environment. The hoped-for outcome is that products and services that are at the same time innovative and compliant will emerge.

There is no mention of a sandbox process in the GDPR or the DPA 2018. There is a formal mechanism for controllers to consult the ICO about new ideas that carry high risk (prior consultation) but the circumstances where that happens are prescribed. It’s more about managing risk than getting headlines. Unlike Data Protection Impact Assessments, prior consultation or certification, the design and operation of the sandbox is entirely within the ICO’s control. It is important to know who is having an influence its development, especially as the sandbox approach is not without risk.

Although Mrs Denham is not above eye-catching enforcement when it suits her, the ICO is often risk averse, and has shown little appetite for challenging business models. For example, the UK’s vibrant data broking market – which is fundamentally opaque and therefore unlawful – has rarely been challenged by Wilmslow, especially not the bigger players. They often get treated as stakeholders. The sandbox could make this worse – big organisations will come with their money-making wheezes, and it’s hard to imagine that ICO staff will want to tell them that they can’t do what they want. The sandbox could leave the ICO implicated, having approved or not prevented dodgy practices to avoid the awkwardness of saying no.

Even if you disagree with me about these risks, it’s surely a good thing that the ICO is transparent about who is having an influence on the process. So I made an FOI request to the ICO, requesting the names and companies or organisations of those who attended the meeting. As is tradition, they replied on the 20th working day to refuse to tell me. According to Wilmslow, disclosure of the attendees’ identities is exempt for four different reasons. Transparency will prejudice the ICO’s ability to carry out its regulatory functions, disclosure of the names of the attendees is a breach of data protection, revealing the names of the organisations will cause them commercial damage, and finally, the information was supplied with an expectation of confidentiality, and so disclosure will breach that duty.

These claims are outrageous. DPIAs and prior disclosure exist, underpinned both by the law and by European Data Protection Board guidance. Despite the obvious benefits of developing a formal GDPR certification process (both allowing controllers to have their processing assessed, and the creation of a new industry at a time when the UK needs all the economic activity it can get), the ICO’s position on certification is supremely arrogant: “The ICO has no plans to accredit certification bodies or carry out certification at this time“. A process set out in detail in the GDPR is shunned, with the ICO choosing instead to spend huge amounts of time and money on a pet project which has no legal basis. Certification could spread expertise across the UK; the sandbox will inevitably be limited to preferred stakeholders. If they’re hiding the identities of those who show up to the workshop, it’s hard to imagine that the actual process will be any more transparent.

The ICO’s arguments about commercial prejudice under S43 of FOI are amateurish: “To disclose that a company has sent delegates to the event may in itself indicate to the wider sector and therefore potential competitors that they are in development of, or in the planning stages of a new innovative product which involves personal data“. A vital principle of FOI is that when using a prejudice-based exemption, you need to show cause and effect. Disclosure will or will be likely to lead to the harm described. How on earth could a company lose money, or become less competitive, purely because it was revealed that they attended an ICO event (which is what using S43 means)?

The ICO’s personal data and confidentiality arguments are equally weak – everyone who attended the meeting would know the identities of everyone else, and all were acting in an official or commercial capacity. This was not a secret or private meeting about a specific project; anyone with an interest was able to apply to attend. Revealing their attendance is not unfair, and there is plainly a legitimate interest in knowing who the ICO is talking to about a project into which the office is putting significant resources, and which will have an impact on products or services that may affect millions of people. The determination to hide this basic information and avoid scrutiny of the sandbox process undermines the credibility of the project itself, and makes the ICO’s claim to be an effective defender of public sector transparency ever more hypocritical.

Worst of all, if disclosure of the attendees’ identity was the calamity for commercial sensitivity and personal data that the ICO claims it to be, there should be an immediate and thorough investigation of how the information I requested came to be revealed on the ICO’s website and twitter account. The entire event was recorded and a promotional video was released. Several attendees (whose names and companies I cannot be given because of confidentiality, data protection and commercial prejudice) are identified and interviewed on camera, while there are numerous shots of other attendees who are clearly identifiable. Either the ICO has betrayed the confidentiality and personal data rights of these people, putting their companies at direct commercial risk, or their FOI response is a cack-handed attempt to avoid legitimate scrutiny. Either way, I strongly recommend that the left hand and the right hand in Wilmslow make some rudimentary attempts to get to know one another.

Long ago, I was one of a number of online commentators described by the ICO’s comms people as a ‘driver of negative sentiment’. More recently, one of Denham’s more dedicated apologists accused me of being one of the regulator’s “adversaries”. I’m not a fan of the ICO, and I never have been. But this stinks. The determination to throw every conceivable exemption at a simple request to know who the ICO is talking to suggests that the office is afraid of scrutiny, afraid of having to justify what they’re doing and how they’re doing it. The incompetence of refusing to give me information that is on display on their website and Twitter account shows contempt for their obligations as an FOI regulator. The ICO has its head in the sand; as we drift out of the European mainstream into a lonely future on the fringes, their secrecy and incompetence should be matters of concern for anyone who cares about Data Protection.

Categories
DP Regulation

The Gamekeeper’s Fear of the Penalty

 

Amongst the hype over the end of negotiations over the new EU Data Protection Regulation, one theme kept emerging again and again: Big Penalties. It’s understandable that people might want to focus on it. The UK goes from a maximum possible penalty of £500,000 to one of just under £15,000,000 (at today’s Euro conversion rate) or even 4% of a private enterprise’s annual worldwide turnover. Only a fool would say that it wasn’t worth talking about. It’s much more interesting than the bit about Codes of Practice, and it’s easier to explain than the section about certification bodies.

It would be equally foolish to assume, however, that penalties on this scale will rain down from Wilmslow like thunderbolts from Zeus. At the same time as many were talking up the future, the Information Commissioner issued two monetary penalties under the current regime, one under Data Protection (£250 for the Bloomsbury Patient Network) and one under the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations (£30,000 for the Daily Telegraph). The £250 penalty is the lowest the ICO has ever issued for anything, while the PECR one is the lowest for a breach of the marketing rules, notwithstanding that the Daily Telegraph is probably the richest PECR target at which the ICO has taken aim.

You could argue that the embarrassment caused to the Telegraph carries an added sting (the ICO has never before taken enforcement action against a newspaper). It’s equally likely that the oligarchs who own the paper will consider £30,000 (£24,000 if they pay up in 35 days) to be a price worth paying if it had the desired effect on the outcome of a very close election. They’ll probably do it again.

In any case, the Bloomsbury Patient Network CMP is much worse. The Regulation calls for monetary penalties to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, and yet everybody at the ICO thought that a £250 penalty, split between three people, was action worth taking and promoting. The Commissioner himself, Christopher Graham told the DMA in March 2015 that the ICO was not a ‘traffic warden‘, but if the Bloomsbury Three pay up on time, the £66.67 penalty they each face is no worse than a parking ticket you didn’t pay in the first fortnight.

The ICO’s press release claims that the penalty would have been much higher if the data controller had not been an ‘unincorporated association’, but this is irrelevant. The ICO issued a £440,000 PECR penalty against two individuals (Chris Niebel and Gary McNeish) in 2012, while the Claims Management Regulator recently issued a whopping £850,000 penalty against Zahier Hussain for cold calling and similar dodgy practices. The approach on PECR and marketing is positively steely. The problem clearly lies in Data Protection enforcement, and that is what the Regulation is concerned with.

The size and resources of the offending data controller are a secondary consideration; the test is whether the penalty will cause undue financial hardship. The ICO could bankrupt someone or kill their business if they deserved it. The Bloomsbury Patient Network’s handling of the most sensitive personal data was sloppy and incompetent, and had already led to breaches of confidentiality before the incident that gave rise to the penalty. Enforcement action at a serious level was clearly justified. Even if the level of the penalty was high enough to deter well-meaning amateurs from processing incredibly sensitive data, this would be a good thing. If you’re not capable of handling data about a person’s HIV status with an appropriate level of security, you have absolutely no business doing so at all, no matter good your intentions are. Donate to the Terence Higgins Trust by all means, but do not touch anyone’s data. If the ICO lacks the guts to issue a serious penalty, it would be better to do nothing at all and keep quiet, rather than display their gutlessness to the world.

Whoever made this decision cannot have considered what message it would send to organisations large and small who already think of Data Protection as pettifogging red tape, low on the agenda. Is there an organisation anywhere in the country that would consider the slim chance of being fined £66.67 to be a deterrent against anything. A fine is a punishment (it has to cause pain to those who pay it) and it is a lesson to others (it has to look painful to the wider world). The Bloomsbury Patient Network CMP is neither.

Despite the increased expectations raised by the GDPR, the ICO is actually losing its appetite for DP enforcement, with 13 Data Protection CMPs in 2013, but only 6 in 2014 and 7 in 2015. Meanwhile, there have been 24 unenforceable DP undertakings in 2015 alone, including one against Google which you’re welcome to explain the point of, and another (Flybe) which revealed endemic procedural and training problems in the airline which are more significant than the moronic cock-ups that went on at the Bloomsbury Patient Network. Wilmslow is so inert that two different organisations have told me this year that ICO staff asked them to go through the motions of self-reporting incidents that ICO already knew about, because the only way the enforcement wheels could possibly begin to turn was if an incident was self-reported. ICO staff actually knowing that something had happened wasn’t enough. It’s these same timid people who will be wielding the new powers in 2018.

Admittedly, there will be a new Commissioner, and it’s possible that the Government will pick a fearsome enforcement fiend to go after Data Protection like a dog in a sausage factory. You’ll forgive me if I don’t hold my breath. Nevertheless, something in Wilmslow has to change, because the General Data Protection Regulation represents a clear rebuke to the ICO’s DP enforcement approach.

Most obviously, in the long list of tasks in Article 52 that each Data Protection Authority must carry out, the first is very powerful: they must “monitor and enforce” (my emphasis) the application of the Regulation. Someone recently said that in certain circumstances, some organisations require a ‘regulatory nudge’, but the Regulation is much more emphatic than that. The ICO’s preference for hand-holding, nuzzling and persuading stakeholders (especially those where former ICO colleagues have gone to work) is a world away from an enforcement-led approach.

The huge increase of penalties throws down the gauntlet, especially when the ICO has rarely approached the current, comparatively low UK maximum. But the ICO should also pay close attention to the detail of Article 79 of the Regulation, where the new penalties are laid out. Of the 59 ICO monetary penalties, 57 have been for breaches of the 7th principle (security). The Regulation has two levels of penalty, the lower with a maximum of €10,000,000 (or 2% of annual turnover), and the higher with a maximum of €20,000,000 (or 4% of annual turnover). Breaches of Article 30, a very close analogue to Principle 7, is in the lower tier.

Admittedly, the higher penalty applies to all of the principles in Article 5 (which in a somewhat circular fashion includes security), but it explicitly covers “conditions for consent“, “data subject rights” and infringements involving transfers to third countries, areas untouched by the ICO’s DP penalty regime. The Regulation envisages monetary penalties at the higher level for processing without a condition, inaccuracy, poor retention, subject access as well as new rights like the right to be forgotten or the right to object. The ICO has issued a solitary penalty on fairness, and just one on accuracy – it has never fined on subject access, despite that being the largest single cause of data subject complaints.

The Regulation bites hard on the use of consent and legitimate interest, and misuse of data when relying on them would again carry the higher penalty. Most organisations that rely on consent or legitimate interest are outside the public sector, who rely more on legal obligations and powers. Indeed, the Regulation even allows for the public sector to be excluded from monetary penalties altogether if a member state wishes it. Nevertheless, since they got the power to issue them, only 24% of the ICO’s civil monetary penalties have been served on organisations outside the public sector (2 for charities and 12 for private sector).

I doubt the ICO is ready for what the Regulation demands, and what data subjects will naturally expect from such a deliberate attempt to shape the enforcement of privacy rights. The penalties are too low. The dwindling amount of DP enforcement is based almost exclusively on self-reported security breaches. While the Regulation might feed a few private sector cases onto the conveyor belt by way of mandatory reporting of security breaches, it will do nothing for the ICO’s ability to identify suitable cases for anything else. Few ICO CMPs spring from data subject complaints, and anyone who has ever tried to alert Wilmslow to an ongoing breach when they are not directly affected knows how painful a process that can be. The ICO has not enforced on most of the principles.

It’s been my habit whenever talking about the Regulation to people I’m working for to emphasise the period we’re about to enter. There are two years before the Regulation comes into force; two years to get ready, to look at practice and procedure, two years to tighten up. The need to adapt to the future goes double for the Information Commissioner’s Office. Instead of canoodling with stakeholders and issuing wishy-washy guidance, wringing its hands and promising to be an ‘enabler’, the ICO should take a long hard look in the mirror. Its job is to enforce the law; everything else is an optional extra. It’s wise to assume that the wish for total DP harmonisation will probably be a pipe dream; it’s equally obvious that the Regulation will allow for much easier comparisons between EU member states, and the ICO’s lightest of light touches will be found wanting.

Categories
DP Regulation

Things To Come

 

The imminent arrival of the #GDPR, as many have already noted, has resulted in a huge amount of speculation, prediction and scaremongering. Stories of massive fines, a torrent of crippling class action lawsuits, 75000 DPO jobs and the emergence of a new volcano in the fields outside Wilmslow* have all captured our attention. Nevertheless, just when I thought I had heard everything, Lawrence Serewicz proved me wrong.

Mr Serewicz issued, with the certainty of an Old Testament prophet, this astounding claim:

Quick #gdpr prediction. By May 2019 the ICO will have issued more, in terms of number of and amount of, “fines” than in the previous years of the MPN era *combined*.

This might be the wildest prediction anyone has made since the GDPR first dropped from the sky (sidenote: feel free to link me to dafter ones). By my quick and dirty calculation, this would mean GDPR fines in excess of £9million and more than 100 fines between May 2018 and May 2019. This isn’t going to happen. Even in a parallel universe where we had a Commissioner who liked taking action, they couldn’t fire out 100 fines in one year. It is inconceivable.

It is probably fair to say that Mr Serewicz and I do not have a relationship marked by mutual respect or affection, but for once, he has inspired me. The idea of predicting what the first year of GDPR will involve is a brilliant one, and I have decided to have a go.

Below are 12 predictions about the first 12 months of GDPR in the UK. For every one that I get wrong, I will donate £20 to the charity Mind. And here’s where you can join in. Look down the list, and see if you disagree. If you spot a prediction that you think will not come true, let me know – in the comments here, on Twitter, via LinkedIn, or via email. If you are right and I am wrong, I will publicly admit that this was the case on this blog. I will celebrate your perspicacity. But if I am right, and you are wrong, you will donate £20 to a charity of your choosing. You don’t have to do anything else and I will not make fun of you. Nobody makes any money except good causes, but imagine me having to grovel and highlight your superior knowledge in print. If three people say I’m going to get one wrong and I don’t, each one makes their donation, but however many people bet against me, if I am wrong, I just pay one £20 per prediction. I will still praise those who get it right.

I will not be a smart-arse about general comments and reactions on social networking sites – if you want to join in, contact me directly and say you want to take up the charity challenge on one of these predictions.

PREDICTION 1

The total amount of GDPR fines (not including PECR and legacy DPA fines) between May 2018 and May 2019 will be less than the total of all DP CMPs up to today’s date.

Yes, this is half of Mr Serewicz’s prediction. Guess what prediction 2 is?

PREDICTION 2

The total amount of GDPR fines (not including PECR and legacy DPA fines)  issued between May 2018 and May 2019 will be less than the total number of all DP CMPs up to today’s date.

PREDICTION 3

There will be less GDPR fines (not including PECR and legacy DPA fines) between May 2018 and May 2019 than between May 2017 and May 2018.

That’s right – I predict the number of fines will decrease in GDPR’s first year of operation.

PREDICTION 4

There will not be a €20 million or UK equivalent fine before the end of May 2019.

I intend no weasel get-outs here – we all know what I mean here. There will not be a maximum possible fine in any circumstances.

PREDICTION 5

There will not be a 4% of annual turnover before the end of May 2019.

As above.

PREDICTION 6

Thinking about the lower level of penalty i.e. under Art 83(4), there will not be a €10 million or UK equivalent fine before the end of May 2019.

PREDICTION 7

Thinking about the lower level of penalty i.e. under Art 83(4), there will not be a 2% of annual turnover or UK equivalent fine before the end of May 2019.

PREDICTION 8

No UK public authority will be fined more than £1 million before the end of May 2019.

PREDICTION 9

No UK company will be fined more than £2 million before the end of May 2019.

I want to be wrong on this one as there will be deserving breaches. I don’t think I will be.

PREDICTION 10

No charity will be fined more than £50,000 before the end of May 2019, unless for a security breach.

PREDICTION 11

No GDPR class action case will have been concluded with a total damages payout of more than £1million before the end of May 2019.

PREDICTION 12

Five of the companies registered on Companies House today with ‘GDPR’ in their name, or a company name whose initials spell ‘G D P R’ will no longer be offering Data Protection services in May 2019.

BONUS ROUND

These ones just for fun as they cannot be measured

  • the number of people describing themselves as ‘Certified GDPR Practitioners’ on LinkedIn will be half what it is now
  • nobody will change their profile to say ‘Certified GDPR Practitioner’ on LinkedIn during May 2019
  • the ICO will still be asking for more staff
  • we will all wonder what all the fuss was about

AND FINALLY: do you have a prediction in the style of those above? If you do, let me know what it is. If I get at least five predictions (and a maximum of 10, I’m not made of money), next month, I will write another blog made of reader suggestions. If this comes off, I will say whether I agree with them or not, and if I disagree with them, it’s another £20 to Mind from me for every one that I get wrong. But contributors must promise that if they get it wrong, they will pay the £20.

This will go wrong in one of two ways. It will capture people’s imagination, and I have given myself a shedload of admin. Or nobody will care, and nobody will join in. But we’ve all read a pile of predictions since all this GDPR nonsense started. Let’s have a bit of fun, and raise a little bit of money for charities at the same time.

 

* In 2017, anything is possible.

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