Unambiguously yours

There’s an old joke about a tourist in Ireland asking for directions and getting the reply ‘If I was you, I wouldn’t start from here’. To anyone in the position of wondering whether to contact all of the people on their mailing list to get GDPR-standard consent to send marketing, fund-raising or promotional emails and texts, I can only say this: I wouldn’t start from here.

With apologies to regular readers who already know (there must be six of you by now), the problem comes because most of the people advising on the solution don’t seem to know what the problem is. They think that the General Data Protection Regulation makes a significant change to the nature of consent from what is required now, and so they tell their clients and employers that there is an urgent need to carry out a ‘re-consenting’ exercise. A memo has clearly gone out – a distinguished correspondent has sent me two examples of organisations sending out emails to get consent in the past week, and yesterday, the charity Stonewall used Valentine’s Day as a prompt to beg its supporters to ‘not leave us this way’. It was lovely, and it is probably an admission that Stonewall have been acting unlawfully since at least 2003, if not 1998.

Here’s the problem. The 1995 Data Protection Directive defines consent like this:

any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed

and

the data subject has unambiguously given his consent

If you’re new to this, read those sentences a few times. Think about ‘freely given’. Think about the consent being an ‘indication’, something by which the person ‘signifies’ their ‘agreement’. Think about ‘unambiguously given‘. If you think that this be interpreted as an opt-out, where are your car keys? Consent, according to you, is me taking your car keys and leaving you a legalistic note somewhere that says that unless you tell me not to borrow your car, I can borrow your car. Or because I borrowed it another time and you didn’t object, I can keep borrowing your car until you tell me not to.

This is nonsense. Consent cannot be inferred. It cannot be implied. A badly written opt-out buried in terms and conditions, consent assumed because I made a donation, the fact that you have my email address and you assume that I must have given it to you with my consent for marketing rather than (for example) you bought it from a list broker who launders dodgy data like drug money – none of these examples constitute consent. Consent is consent. You asked and I said yes. We all know what it means and to pretend otherwise is to lie so you can persuade yourself that you can spam people.

Yes, the GDPR adds a couple of things. It requires consent to be ‘demonstrable’. It states explicitly that consent can only be obtained by a ‘statement or by a clear affirmative action’. But if you claim that the absence of the above phrase in the Directive is any help to the opt-out model, you’re lying to yourself. An opt-out is inherently ambiguous, and the directive says that consent cannot be unambiguous. I might have misunderstood the wording (especially if the language was clunky or technical, which it often is), the data may have been obtained for a different purpose and the consent option is buried in terms and conditions, I might just have missed it or forgotten. The Directive is clear.

Jump ahead to the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations, based on Directive 2002/58/EC (often known the ePrivacy Directive). The definition of consent comes from the Data Protection Directive, and so if the ePrivacy Directive says you need consent, what you need is unambiguous, freely given, specific and informed consent. The ePrivacy Directive is enacted by the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, or PECR (which all good people pronounce as ‘Pecker’ and revel in the opportunities that doing so affords them).

PECR makes life even harder for the opt-outers. For emails, PECR says that the recipient must have “previously notified the sender that he consents for the time being to such communications being sent by, or at the instigation of, the sender“. If you think that a person can ‘notify’ you by not doing something (i.e. not opting-out), once again, where are your car keys?

Surprisingly given all the execrable practice to which the Commissioner happily turns a blind eye, Wilmslow fired a shot across everyone’s bows with three enforcement cases last year. Morrisons and Flybe are to some extent red herrings as they deliberately targeted people who had explicitly opted out of receiving direct marketing, so when the companies emailed them asking them to opt back in, it was plainly bullshit. The Honda case is more interesting, in the sense that Honda ignored everyone who had opted in (because they’d opted in) and everyone who had opted out (naturally). They contacted people where they didn’t know either way, where they held no evidence of consent. Despite the fact that in all three cases, the contact itself wasn’t selling anything, all were sent for marketing purposes, and here, the ICO argued that the organisations didn’t have consent for sending emails for marketing purposes. It’s been argued by idiots that all Honda were trying to do was comply with GDPR, but that’s patently false. They were trying to pack out their marketing list before a perceived change in the law (GDPR) while ignoring another law that was just fine thanks (PECR).

And now we come to the payoff. If Stonewall (and all the others) have consent to send fund-raising emails, they don’t need to ask again. If they don’t have freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous consent, they shouldn’t be sending emails for marketing purposes now, even if the purpose is to ask for consent from people who are happy to give it because the email is inherently unlawful. It wouldn’t be unlawful for Stonewall to write to all of its supporters and ask them for consent, because post isn’t electronic so PECR doesn’t apply. I would say that there is plainly a legitimate interest for them to use post to ask people for permission to send fund-raising and promotional correspondence by email, so there is no GDPR problem.

The problem with a re-consenting exercise is that the organisation is basically admitting to a PECR breach. The problem is exacerbated by doing that re-consenting exercise by email, because as Honda have demonstrated, doing so is in itself a breach of PECR. People complained to the ICO about the Honda emails, which is why they enforced. If you do a re-consenting exercise by email, anyone irritated enough by the request may well complain. Then what?

So what do I think organisations should do in the light of all this? Well, I wouldn’t start from here. But ignoring the law for a moment, this might be a time to be pragmatic. If you send people content that they want and you don’t annoy them (email being less annoying and distracting than phone or text in my opinion), if you have nice big bright unsubscribe buttons, and if YOU RESPECT BLOODY UNSUBSCRIBE REQUESTS (Hello Daily Telegraph), what’s the risk? Why draw attention to yourself?

I am convinced that sending emails to people who haven’t opted-in is unlawful unless you’ve got the soft opt-in (which because it’s predicated on data gathered through a sale, most charities won’t have). But many organisations have been content to do that for years despite it being unlawful now. So what’s actually changing? I think everyone should comply with the law because privacy – the right to be left alone – is a vital foundation for a civilised society. But if you’re sitting on a mailing list and you’re not sure what to do with it, I would forgive you if you took a slower, longer path, taking every natural opportunity to get renewed consent from existing contacts, getting strong unambiguous consent from anyone new, and hoping that churn and natural wastage gets you where you need to be. And if you’re wrestling with this right now and you’ve read this far, good luck and best wishes.

Catch the Pidgeon

Even before the fundraising sector met its Data Protection nemesis in December, with two charities cruelly hung out on the rack, forbidden ever to raise funds again (CORRECTION: given two of the smallest fines in Data Protection history and not forbidden from doing anything), various blogs, and tweets showed that anguished tin-rattlers were confused about what they were accused of.

A classic of the genre was published just over a week ago by Third Sector, penned by Stephen Pidgeon, a “consultant and teacher” (one assumes modesty prevented the publication from mentioning that until recently he chaired the Institute of Fundraising’s Standards Committee, responsible for the until-recently legally incorrect Code of Fundraising Practice). Pidgeon made a series of assertions in his article, and the most important of them is wrong.

Pidgeon describes profiling as a serendipitous activity – a fundraiser innocently planning some door-drops (not a hint of pestering spam in this charming scenario, nor any resort to a data-mining outfit like Prospecting for Gold) happens to notice that a donor has sold a business, and so decides to add his details to an existing campaign. The scheme is ruined by the ICO who says: “That’s not allowed – it’s against the Data Protection Act without express permission“. As Pidgeon points out, the DPA is much vaguer than that. If the Commissioner had indeed said this, it would be nonsense. The problem is, they didn’t.

Both charity notices set out the ICO’s position on charity profiling – it cannot be secret. The same is true for data sharing and appending new data to records that the subject didn’t provide. Neither notice finds profiling without consent to be a breach. Admittedly, of the Data Protection only offers one other option to justify profiling in these circumstances (legitimate interests), but either Pidgeon doesn’t know what the notice says, or he is deliberately misleading his audience. The word ‘permission’ does not appear in either notice, and the word ‘consent’ isn’t mentioned either.

Pidgeon also asserts that wealth profiling is not confined to charities:

This issue is not confined to charities. Yet, in all the 100-plus ICO adjudications in 2016, I could not find a single commercial firm censured for wealth screening.

To be pedantic, they’re not unenforceable ‘adjudications’, they’re formal legal notices, and if you add up all of the DP and PECR monetary penalty and enforcement notices in 2016, you don’t get to 100. He might be including the undertakings, which could be compared to the blancmange adjudications that charities have grown used to, but they’re irrelevant in a conversation about enforcement. The more important point is that like others, including the fundraising apologist academic Ian McQuillin and the researcher Matt Ide, Pidgeon claims that everyone does wealth screening but only the charities are getting punished for it. The Daily Mail hasn’t exposed Marks and Spencers or Greggs for wealth screening – possibly because they’re good at keeping it secret, but a more likely explanation is that they don’t do it. Until someone in the charity sector shows evidence of another organisation doing secret profiling, it’s just a distraction from the fact that – as Pidgeon claims – most of the charity sector have been doing it unlawfully for years.

Many in the sector also seem persuaded that the ICO action is a weird anti-charity vendetta. MacQuillin’s contributions to the Critical Fundraising Blog pondered the mystifying question of why the data protection regulator has taken action when household name organisations have been exposed for breaching data protection. The ICO takes action for three reasons – an organisation reports itself for something, ICO gets lots of complaints about something, or something makes a big splash in the press. There were thousands of complaints about charity fundraising, but all went to the toothless Fundraising Standards Board, who hardly ever passed them on to ICO. So it was the Daily Mail’s headlines that did the trick – the heartbreaking story of Olive Cooke but more importantly for the ICO’s purposes, the flamboyantly unlawful way in which charities treated Samuel Rae, trading his data relentlessly with anyone who wanted it.

In pursuing his false claim about consent, Pidgeon derisively summarised what charities might have to say to prospective donors: “We want to find out how rich you are; tick here to agree”! As a first draft, this has some merit, but a charity involved in wealth screening should also add ‘We want to know whether you are worth more alive or dead‘. The consent claim is a red herring, but perhaps unwittingly, Pidgeon has hit on the real problem for fundraisers: daylight. The foundation of Data Protection is fairness, and the only way to achieve it, regardless of whether consent is part of the mix, is to tell the subject the purposes for which their data will be used. Stretching the law as far as they can, the ICO has invented the concept of ‘reasonable expectations’. Reasonable expectations doesn’t appear in the Data Protection Act, but the ICO’s idea is that if you are only doing something that the person would expect, you don’t have to spell it out. One might take issue with this because it’s not in the Act, but it’s a sensible idea. The ICO’s emphasis has always been on being transparent over unexpected or objectionable processing.

Tesco’s Clubcard scheme is a useful example. Clubcard is a loyalty scheme, clearly based on profiling. The user knows that when they swipe their card, their purchases are analysed so that tailored offers and vouchers can be provided. Needless to say, Tesco also use the data for their sales and marketing strategy. If you look at the T&Cs for the Clubcard scheme, you will not find references to data sharing with third parties for wealth screening. They don’t need to – they can analyse your purchases instead. The user knows that profiling is inherent to the scheme, and they are not required to participate when shopping at Tesco. I have a Clubcard because I understand the system and I don’t believe that Tesco flogs my data. The profiling is the basis on which the whole thing operates. I have a choice about whether to shop at Tesco, and separately, whether to have a Clubcard when I do.

On the other hand, the RSPCA profiled seven million donors after they donated; presumably the lion’s share of all people who donated to the charity. The RSPCA did not tell people that this was the purpose for which their data will be used, and nobody outside the charity sector was aware of what was happening. Unlike Clubcard, donors could not participate without being screened and analysed by the charity. I have used the wealth-screening example on many of my training courses. The reaction is always surprise, and often revulsion.  Nobody ever leaps to the charity’s defence because secret profiling is a dodgy way to do business.

Pidgeon’s squeamishness about describing the process – the daft example of the story in the newspaper, his emphasis on data being gathered from the public domain – suggests that fundraisers are more ambivalent about their methods than they might like to admit. The existence of five facts in five separate publicly accessible places is different to the combination of those facts in one place, gathered with the intention of tailored marketing. A profile is greater than the sum of its parts, and people should be told that it exists. Pidgeon isn’t alone in his approach – Chris Carnie, the founder of ‘prospect research’ company Factary erroneously characterised myself and others as saying that using public domain data is “an intrusion into an individual’s privacy. That searching for a named individual in Companies House fundamentally affects the rights of that person“. All I said was that such research should be transparent, but this isn’t news that Carnie and his colleagues find palatable. Ide’s company goes as far as to assess the ‘ethical credentials‘ of a donor, which sounds a world away from noticing a story in a paper.

The Daily Mail is a revolting newspaper – the worst combination of small-minded, petty conservatism and curtain-twitching prurience. It is a matter of ongoing annoyance to me that the Mail is one of the very few national news outlets that covers Data Protection issues with any enthusiasm. I really wish the Guardian or the Times had exposed the ghastly exploitation of vulnerable people like Samuel Rae, or their hunger for information about possible donors. I wish Dispatches’ fine work on the shameful state of some fundraising call centres had got more attention. Nevertheless, none of this is the Mail’s fault, and fundraisers’ relentless blame-shifting needs to be called out for the cant that it is. Everyone knows whose fault this is.

The charity and fundraising sector isn’t in a mess over data protection because of the Daily Mail, and it isn’t there because of the Information Commissioner. This problem is the fault of some fundraisers and their agents not obeying the law, and trustees who didn’t ask them enough questions. MacQuillin claims that almost everything that has happened to the fundraising sector over the past two years is because of ‘fake news‘; Olive Cooke’s death wasn’t, her family says, the result of the spam tsunami that charities subjected her to. For one thing, this claim disgracefully ignores Samuel Rae, whose story would have caused the same interest even if it wasn’t the sequel to Olive Cooke. Moreover, it is itself fake news. If some of Pidgeon and MacQuillin’s compadres had done their job with a greater interest in the law, they wouldn’t be here now. This is the second or third time I have written this blog. With 11 more possible fines, and fundraisers still in denial about what they have done, I’ll probably have to write it again before long.

Small change

Some senior figures in the charity sector have sought to deal with the Information Commissioner’s recent enforcement against the RSPCA and the British Heart Foundation by suggesting that the ICO’s action is disproportionate and unfair. The fundraiser sorry, academic, Ian MacQuillin has written two blogs which touch on the theme, while a few days ago, Robert Meadowcroft, the Chief Executive of Muscular Dystrophy UK tweeted:

If the is impartial regulator it will investigate practices of and not simply pursue charities

As 2016 is now disappearing over the horizon, I thought it was worth testing the hypothesis that the ICO is taking disproportionate action against charities, and the fines and other enforcement against charities are unrepresentative. TL:DR – it’s complete nonsense.

In 2016, the ICO issued 34 civil monetary penalties – 11 under the Data Protection Act, and 23 under the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations (PECR). There are a number of different ways of looking at the figures, and none of them show any evidence of disproportionality.

1) Charity CMPs as a proportion of the total in 2016

Of the 34 penalties, 2 were against charities, so 6% of the ICO’s CMPs in 2016 were against charities.

2) Amount charities were fined, as a proportion of the total in 2016

The CMP total was £3,225,500. The total of CMPs issued against charities was £43,000. This is 1.3% of the total.

3) Proportion of Data Protection CMPs issued to charities in 2016

If you look only at the CMPs issued under Data Protection, the charity proportion is not insignificant – there were 11 DP CMPs, so the 2 charity CMPs are 18% of the total – the same as the police, 1 more than councils, but less than the private sector or the NHS (3 each). However, this is the only comparison where charities feature significantly, and they are not the dominant sector. The next two comparisons are also instructive.

4) Proportion of PECR CMPs issued to charities in 2016

None. This is despite widespread breaches of PECR by charities, including phoning donors who are on TPS and sending texts and emails without consent (for example, the vast majority of mobile numbers gathered via charity posters in 2016 were obtained in breach of PECR).

5) Proportion of CMPs issued for marketing related activities in 2o16

There were 21 PECR CMPs related to marketing, and 2 DP CMPs related to marketing, making 23 marketing CMPs in all. 2 were against charities, which is 9.5% of the total. Given the big charities’ disastrous approach to marketing, this relatively small number is astonishing.

6) Level of CMPs in 2016

The average DP CMP was £108,500; the average charity DP CMP was £21,500.

The average PECR CMP was £84,666.75; there were no charity PECR CMPs.

The highest DP CMP was £400,000; the highest charity DP CMP was £25,000.

7) Other enforcement in 2016

There were 22 enforcement notices issued by the ICO in 2016, 8 under DP and 14 under PECR. 1 of the 8 DP enforcement notices was against a charity, which is 4.5% of the total, or 12.5% of the total DP enforcement notices. Either way, it is a small percentage of the total. Again, if you count the number of marketing related enforcement notices, there were 15, of which 1 was against a charity. This is 6.6% of the total.

8) CMPs since 2010

There have been 69 DP CMPs since 2010 that I can find (they drop off the ICO’s website after a few years); 4 were issued against registered charities, which is 5.8% of the total. The average DP CMP was £114, 163, whereas the average charity was £78,250. It is worth noting that these figures are slightly skewed by the £200,000 penalty against the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, which is a registered charity but receives most of its funding from the NHS.

The CMP against the British Heart Foundation was the 8th lowest CMP overall, while the CMP against the RSPCA was the 9th lowest. The only organisations to receive lower penalties than the charities were small businesses, unincorporated associations, and a bankrupt lawyer.

There have been 47 PECR CMPs that I can find since 2012; none have been issued on charities, which is 0% of the total.

Conclusion

These figures will likely be different in 2017. The ICO has signalled that more DP enforcement against charities is coming, and so the proportion of DP penalties may rise when the totals are in, but that depends on a variety of different factors including the number of other penalties and the ICO’s general approach. However, when you look at the facts for 2016, MacQuillin and Meadowcroft are wrong. Despite years of ignoring the Data Protection and PECR requirements in favour of a flawed, fundraiser-driven approach, the ICO has not taken disproportionate action against the charities. The action taken is a small percentage of the overall total. Special pleading and blame-shifting will not help the sector. Compliance with the law will.

Fair Cop

The bedrock of Data Protection is fairness. You cannot gain consent without fairness. Your interests are not legitimate interests if they are secret interests. Unless you have an exemption or you claim that telling the person represents disproportionate effort (i.e. the effort of telling outweighs the actual impact), you have to tell the person whose data you are using the purposes for which their data will be used, and any other information necessary to make the processing fair.

The ICO’s Privacy Notices Code of Practice is not ambiguous, nor was its predecessor. It is impossible to read the ICO’s published guidance on fair processing without taking away the key message, consistently repeated for more than a decade: if something is surprising or objectionable, especially if it involves some kind of impact or sharing outside the organisation, it should be spelt out. New-ish Information Commissioner Elizabeth Denham seems to have chosen to reverse the ICO’s previously timid, unimaginative approach to the first principle with a pair of civil monetary penalties against charities. We have one each for the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and the British Heart Foundation, with the promise of more to come. You might say it was unfortunate that charities are first in line rather than, say, credit reference agencies or list brokers (to be a touch tautological). It was the charity sector’s misfortune to fall under the Daily Mail’s Basilisk gaze, and they have to accept that we are where we are.

To issue a civil monetary penalty, there are three hurdles for the ICO to clear. Firstly, there must be a serious breach. Both charities used commercial companies to profile thousands (and in one case, millions) of donors, buying up data from publicly available sources* to assess their wealth and resources, they shared data with other charities whose identity they did not know via a commercial company, and in the case of the RSPCA, they bought contact details to fill in data that donors had provided. The average donor did not have any idea that this was happening. I can see there’s a problem that when everyone in the charity sector knows that wealth screening goes on, it seems normal. But I’ve been using it as an example on my training courses ever since the Mail revealed it, and bear in mind that these are often seasoned data protection professionals who know about data sharing and disclosure, attendees are invariably shocked and some cases revolted by what I tell them.

There is no doubt in my mind that this processing needed to be spelt out, and there is no doubt from the notices that it was not. Carefully selected third parties or partners has been a stupid lie in marketing for years, but not even knowing where the data goes is much worse than the usual flogging it to all comers. At least the list broker knows who he’s flogging it to, even though the only careful selection is the ability to pay.

The second hurdle is the need to show that the breach is likely to cause damage or distress to the affected data subjects. It’s been known for quite some time that the ICO was planning to take enforcement action over the Mail stories, and the gossip I heard from charities was that fines were likely. I’ll be honest, I wasn’t convinced. The Information Commissioner lost a Data Protection Tribunal appeal from Scottish Borders Council because they bungled the damage / distress element of a £250000 CMP over pension records found in recycling bins. ICO made a flawed claim that the loss of paper pension records was likely to result in identity theft, but Borders had an expert witness who could argue convincingly that this was not true. The link between the breach (the absence of a contract with the company processing the data) and the damage was broken, and the ICO lost.

But this case is different. The ICO does not need to make a link between an incident and a breach, because they are bound up together here. Both notices show that the ICO has given considerable thought to the distress angle. There is no question that the charities breached the first principle, and their only hope for an appeal is to convince the Tribunal that people would not be caused substantial distress by secret profiling and data sharing after an act of generosity. This is not science, and all I can say is that I am persuaded. But for an appeal to be successful, the charities will need to persuade a Tribunal with strong experience and knowledge of DP and PECR from the numerous (and almost exclusively doomed) marketing appeals.

The third element requires the breach to be deliberate or a situation where the charities ought reasonably to have known about the breach. As I have already said, the ICO’s position on fair processing is well known in my sector and available to anyone who can type the ICO’s web address. I think it’s possible that the charities didn’t know what they were doing was a breach, but in my opinion, this is because the Institute of Fundraising and the Fundraising Standards Board effectively acted as a firewall between charities and reality. The advice (often inaccurate and out of date) came from the IoF, and complaints about charities went to the FRSB and no further. When your code of practice is written by the people who earn their living from fundraising and most in your sector are doing the same thing as you are, it’s not hard to fool yourself into thinking it’s OK. But ‘everybody does it’ will cut no ice with the Tribunal. The RSPCA and the BHF are not tiny charities flailing in the dark – they are massive, multi-million pound operations with vastly greater resources than many of my clients.

Daniel Fluskey, head of Policy for the Institute of Fundraising, whose apparent lack of experience or qualifications in Data Protection does not prevent him from writing inaccurate articles for the charity sector on GDPR, has already weighed in, saying that the ICO should be providing the specific wording that charities require: “Charities need more detail on the ICO’s view of what lawful practice looks like: what form of words would have passed the test?” The Information Commissioner is the regulator for every organisation, of every size and shape, that processes personal data. If they start writing tailored wording for charities, they will have to do it for everyone else as well. It is a ridiculous demand. I think the ICO should move on to the data pools, wealth screeners and list brokers, but if she could find the time to issue an enforcement notice on the Institute of Fundraising, forbidding them ever to speak or write on Data Protection matters again, the third sector would have a fighting chance of complying.

Besides, how hard is it to find compliant wording? Nobody – especially not the trade association for fundraisers – should be allowed to present this as a byzantine and complex task. The individual doesn’t need to know what software you’re using, or whether cookies are involved. They need to understand the purpose – what are you collecting, what are you going to do with it, who are you going to give it to? This should be presented without euphemism or waffle, but it’s when you strip out the legalistic nonsense, you see the problem. It isn’t that the poor charities were labouring under the burden of complex data protection rules. They could not comply with the Data Protection Act because what they were doing (and in RSPCA’s case, are apparently still doing) is so unattractive:

  • We will share your details with unspecified charities via a commercial company. We don’t know who they are.
  • We will buy your phone number, postal or email address from a commercial company if you have not given it to us.
  • We will use commercial companies to compile a profile of your wealth and property to work out whether to ask you for further donations. If you are likely to be worth a lot when you die, we will use this information to ask you for a bequest.

When Reactiv Media appealed their PECR penalty, the Tribunal rejected their appeal and increased the penalty. Like a lot of the spammers, they put themselves into administration to avoid paying up, but this option is not available to household name charities. If either the RSPCA or BHF appeal, they are dragging themselves deeper into the mud, and very possibly spending thousands more of donors’ money to do so. If they say that what they did wasn’t a breach, or that they couldn’t have been expected to know that it was, their officers, advice and business model will be scrutinised to a doubtlessly painful extent. The claims management company Quigley and Carter found themselves described as “feckless” and “most unimpressive” in the course of being filleted during a recent failed appeal. Do charities really want that? Even if they decide to roll the dice solely on distress, does either charity really want to acknowledge a serious breach that they knew or ought to have know about in the hope of getting the fine overturned on a technicality? Do they want ICO to call donors as witnesses?

The business model of pressure selling, TPS-busting, heavy texting, data sharing and donor-swapping adopted by some of the UK’s most celebrated charities resembles nothing so much as the activities of the claims management, PPI spammers (i.e. the scum of the earth). For all the noise and bluster on Twitter and in the charity press this week, there is an uncomfortable truth that has to be faced. The hated Daily Mail unearthed it, and the ICO has rightly acted on it. Some big charities have run an end-justifies-the-means approach to marketing and they have got away with it for a decade. Fundraisers ruled the roost, and compliance has been sidelined or ignored. Given how much money the RSPCA and the BHF have raised from fundamentally unlawful practices, they should pull back and rethink how they get donations in the future. They should ignore the Institute of Fundraising’s every word on Data Protection and PECR, and like every other charity, concentrate on reading and applying the ICO’s Code on Privacy Notices and guidance on Direct Marketing.

And right now, if there is a fundraiser sitting with the two CMP notices working out how to at the same time devise a method to raise loads of cash for their cause while complying with Data Protection and PECR, I hope they wipe the floor with everyone else.

*citation needed

Less than ideal

Last week, Stephen Lee, an academic and former fundraiser was reported as having attacked the Information Commissioner’s Office for their interpretation of direct marketing at a fundraising conference. It was, he said “outrageous” that the Commissioner’s direct marketing guidance stated that any advertising or marketing material that promoted the aims and ideals of a not-for-profit organisation was covered by Data Protection. According to Lee, only fundraising activities should be considered to be marketing.

[NB: Third Sector articles are sometimes open to all and sometimes limited to subscribers. If the links don’t work, please accept my apologies!]

He is quoted as saying “Who says that’s right? Just the ICO. Who did it consult? No one.” and  went on to say “Why and how and in what way should we be compelled to comply with that proposition?”

Who says that’s right? Who did the ICO consult? Well, let me see now.

1) The Council of Europe

In 1985, the Council of Europe issued a Recommendation on the protection of personal data used for the purposes of direct marketing. The definition of direct marketing includes both the offer of goods or services and “any other messages” to a segment of the population. The recommendation predates the guidance Mr Lee disparages by more than 30 years.

2) The 1995 Data Protection Directive

The Directive makes clear that direct marketing rules apply equally to charitable organisations and political parties as they do to commercial organisations, and emphasises the need for people to be able to opt-out of direct marketing. By redrawing the definition, Mr Lee would contradict this fundamental right.

3) The Data Protection Act 1998

Given that Mr Lee feels qualified to make bold statements about the interpretation of the Data Protection Act, it’s odd that he doesn’t seem to have taken the time to read it. Section 11 of the Act states that the definition of Direct Marketing “the communication (by whatever means) of any advertising and marketing material which is directed at particular individuals”. The important word there is “any” – organisations do not get to pick and choose which of their promotional messages are covered and which are not.

4) The Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003

PECR sets up the rules for consent over electronic direct marketing (consent for automated calls, opt-out and TPS for live calls, consent for emails and texts). It does not define direct marketing, but instead says this “Expressions used in these Regulations that are not defined in paragraph (1) and are defined in the Data Protection Act 1998 shall have the same meaning as in that Act”. Therefore, the DPA definition applies to PECR.

5) The Information Tribunal (now the First Tier Tribunal)

In 2005, the Information Commissioner served an Enforcement Notice on the Scottish National Party after they repeatedly and unrepentantly used automated calls featuring Sean Connery to promote the party in the General Election. The SNP appealed, and in 2006, the Information Tribunal considered the issue. One of the main elements of the SNP appeal was against the ICO’s definition of direct marketing. Although the case is about a political party, the ICO’s submissions are based on the proposition that charities as well as political parties are covered by the definition of direct marketing, and that the definition cannot be restricted to fundraising alone. The Tribunal accepted the ICO’s view in full, and dismissed the appeal.

6) The charity sector and anyone else who wanted to be consulted

The ICO may have issued guidance in the 1980s or 1990s on the definition of direct marketing, but the idea that promoting aims and ideals is part of it has been their view since 1999. In guidance issued on the precursor to PECR, the ICO stated clearly that direct marketing includes “not just to the offer for sale of goods or services, but also the promotion of an organisations aims and ideals”. They specifically mentioned charities, as they have ever since. Virtually every iteration of the ICO’s guidance on PECR and direct marketing has been subject to public consultation – indeed, the very guidance Lee is talking about was subject to a public consultation.

Here’s the problem. Lee is an Honorary Fellow of the Institute of Fundraising, and has a long association with it. The IoF has been the most consistently pernicious influence on the charity sector’s compliance with data protection and privacy law in the past ten years. Their guidance and public utterances on data protection are often misleading, and they recently had to change their own Code of Practice because it was legally incorrect. At best, they haven’t noticed the ICO position on charities and direct marketing for more than 15 years. At worst, they deliberately ignored it in favour of an interpretation that largely suits fundraisers. Lee complained at the conference about the “appalling” communication between the ICO and charity umbrella bodies, but Richard Marbrow of the ICO summed the problem up all too well:

One of the things the sector asked for was clarity, and I will try and bring you that. The trouble is, if you then say ‘we don’t like that clarity, could we have some different clarity please?’, we’re not going to get on very well.”

The most important thing about Lee’s outburst is the subtext – if any form of communication is not covered by the definition of direct marketing, then your consent is not required  in the first place and you have no right to stop receiving it. His interpretation is nonsense, but it is also ethically unsound. At its most basic level, privacy means the right to be left alone, the right to have an area of your life which is yours, which others can’t intrude into. Lee seems to want to erode that right. If his view was correct (it’s not), charities could bombard people with phone calls, texts or emails to tell them how marvellous they are, how important their work is, how vital they are for society. As long as they don’t ask for money, the logic of his argument is that people wouldn’t be able to stop them.

Lee’s other question (“Why and how and in what way should we be compelled to comply with that proposition?”) has an easy answer. Ignore it. Carry on breaching the law, ignoring the rules. I went to the cinema last night and saw adverts for two different charities that plainly breached PECR, so that seems to be the plan. Given that the furore over charities began with an innocent person bombarded with unwanted correspondence, it’s remarkable that senior figures in the charity sector are ready for another go, but if Mr Lee wants to drag charities’ reputations deeper into a swamp that they share with PPI scammers and payday loan merchants, he’s welcome.

But the ICO should not listen to their concerns, or open friendly channels of communication with the sector. They should apply the law firmly and regularly until the charities get the message. If this results in more enforcement against charities than other sectors, that will be only because the big charities are among the worst offenders and they haven’t put their houses in order. If charity giving suffers as a result, even amongst the many charities that have not transgressed, they should stop blaming others and look to their fundraisers, their colleagues and themselves.