Age of Consent

Ever since the Daily Mail first started to report on the nefarious fundraising activities of certain large charities, confusion and contradiction have reigned supreme. We have had fundraising codes of practice confused with the law, constant claims that the ICO has changed the law (which is something they haven’t done, and couldn’t do anyway), and the bizarre spectacle of undertakings being signed publicly by organisations who, according to Wilmslow, haven’t done anything wrong.

One might hope that the General Data Protection Regulation, designed as it is to clarify the mess of DP across the European continent would come to our aid. But no, sadly and inevitably, people are just as determined to misunderstand the GDPR as they are the Data Protection Act.

John Mitchison, head of preference services, compliance and legal at the Direct Marketing Association was speaking at a fundraising event organised by Third Sector magazine, and he passed comment on the apparent confusion over opt-in and opt-out rules on marketing. I don’t know exactly what he said because I wasn’t there. However, he is reported as saying that charities would not need consent for postal and phone marketing, unless a person was on the telephone preference service. The GDPR requirement for unambiguous consent did not change this position. Mr Mitchison also apparently said that he didn’t understand where all the confusion in the charity sector was coming from.

I think I can tell him. Enter Daniel Fluskey, head of Policy and Research at the Institute of Fundraising (yes, the organisation responsible for much of the confusion with their diabolical fundraising code). He wrote an article on the UK Fundraising website following up on Mitchison’s comments, including this statement.

“Our understanding is the same as the DMA’s and what we’ve heard from solicitors – that ‘unambiguous consent’ does not mean there has to be an ‘opt in’ tick box. Consent will be able to be given ‘unambiguously’ through an ‘opt out’ mechanism. So, statements that ‘opt in’ is coming in through law seem likely to be misleading – what’s coming in is a requirement that the consent is ‘unambiguous’

Fluskey then invents his own test for unambiguous consent:

To me, ‘unambiguous’ consent seems like a three-stage test:

  1. Did someone give their information freely?
  2. Were they presented with straightforward information so that they had a clear understanding of what marketing/fundraising communications they could expect to receive?
  3. Did they have a clear and easy ability to choose to accept this, or to object if they didn’t want to receive future marketing?
    If the outcome of the engagement leads to these three questions being able to be answered with a ‘yes’ then it would seem very likely that the donor has given ‘unambiguous’ consent. That seems very much like achieving the spirit and ethos of ‘opting in’ even if there isn’t necessarily a tick box.”

This is all – to use a technical term – bollocks.

Mitchison is correct – consent is not necessary for postal marketing and phone-calls to those not on TPS. However, this has nothing to do with the nature of unambiguous consent. The explanation is reasonably straightforward. To use any personal data, you need to meet a condition under the DPA – this is the position now and it remains so under the GDPR. Consent is one of the conditions but not the only one. If an alternative condition can be found, you can forget consent and use the other one instead. The GDPR recognises that the legitimate interests condition can be used to justify marketing, and so this can apply to postal marketing. You don’t need consent because you can use legitimate interests. The opt-out bit is a red herring in this context – the marketer offers an opt-out because  it’s good practice and the subject has an automatic right to opt-out of any marketing anyway. It would be nice if such opt-outs were respected instantly and permanently, but that’s an issue for another time.

Electronic forms of marketing are not just covered by Data Protection. They are also covered by the e-Privacy Directive, implemented in the UK as PECR. PECR adds a layer of rules, and in some cases insists that only consent applies. You can’t rely on legitimate interests for automated calls, email or text marketing, because PECR says that only consent will do.

Live calls straddle both conditions. You can rely on legitimate interests for cold calls to people who are not on TPS, but you need consent for those people who are. Again, this is nothing to do with DP, this is an extra rule laid on by PECR. I hold no brief for Mr Mitchison, but the DMA are usually robust about the effect of marketing law, so my guess is that this is the point he was making.

I haven’t explained completely why I think Mr Fluskey’s comments are bollocks. Permit me to do so now. I suspect he hasn’t even read the Regulation, despite the fact that he is issuing clear (if bogus) advice about it to a sector that has wallowed in ignorance for far too long.

The definition of consent in Article 4 is plain for all to see: “any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her” – indication means active, given means active, clear affirmative action means active. Everything about the definition of consent means that the subject has to do something to consent. It’s obvious that Fluskey hasn’t read the regulation because he happily takes ‘freely given’ out of its context as part of the definition of consent and pretends that it relates to the provision of information. If there was any doubt (there isn’t, but we’re here now), Recital 32 helpfully addresses any possible uncertainty:

Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent.

Once again, just in case you missed it: “Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent.”  Compare that to what Mr Fluskey says: “‘unambiguous consent’ does not mean there has to be an ‘opt in’ tick box”. They saw him coming. That’s exactly what it does mean, that’s what it says. Consent has to be active, and it has to be demonstrable. Silence or inaction does not mean consent, but that’s exactly what an opt-out model represents – assuming consent from silence or inaction. Under the GDPR, opt-out consent is dead. There’s an argument that this is the case under the current DP as well, but leave that to one side. Nobody who has read the full Regulation can think that opt-out is a valid way to get consent, and only those who have read it should be giving advice to others.

The problem with the Institute of Fundraising is that their code of practice has created a fog of uncertainty about what is law and what is practice or industry standard. And here they are, doing it again: “That seems very much like achieving the spirit and ethos of ‘opting in’ even if there isn’t necessarily a tick box.” Complying with the regulation isn’t about trying to capture some phantom ethos – it’s clear, and unambiguous. No opt-outs, never again.

Don’t get me wrong. Fundraising companies have a problem. For many years, they have built profitable businesses, employed lots of people, and made lots of money, some of it even for the charities who hire them. The GDPR makes clear what was not clear, emphasises what has been underplayed, and gives new rights to subjects that will directly challenge the business model of some fundraisers. Consent has to be clear and it has to be opt-in. Profiling has be to explained to subjects, and they have significant rights to challenge and object to it. Data sharing cannot be justified on tiny, badly-explained clauses buried in interminable terms and conditions. I can understand that the more they delve into the GDPR, the more fundraising companies may despair.

But denial and confusion is not the answer, and this nonsense must end. The Institute of Fundraising has to stop issuing inaccurate and confusing guidance which, let’s assume coincidentally, has the effect of maximising the number of calls, texts and emails that can be made and sent. Charities have been battered for a while now, some with more justification than others. But they have no hope of emerging from the mess and getting back to where they should be if this endless stream of misinformation continues to be sprayed at them. The problem for some fundraisers is not that the GDPR is confusing. It is that it is not.

Comments

  1. so are you saying that charities can continue to use legitimate interests and therefore won’t need consent anyway?

    Thank you for the interesting article, but I am still a bit confused as to how legitimate interests come in. Wierdly, it seems that charities will have more rights to cold call people (who aren’t on TPS) than to call their own donors.

    • The way it works is this

      Live call to TPS registered number – consent only
      Live call to non-TPS registered number – legit. interests opt-out
      Live call to someone who has said don’t call – don’t call
      Email: consent (i.e. I want to receive email)
      Text: consent (i.e. I want to receive text)
      Automated call: consent (i.e. I want to receive automated call)
      Fax: consent / go back to 1996

      Post: legit. interests opt-out

      The fact that a person is a donor is irrelevant – always has been, always will be. Only relevant factor is as above. Various people have tried to claim that existing donors are somehow different or significant. Legally, they’re not.

      • Thanks again for that clarification. So for ‘Live Call to non-TPS registered number’, can you call the number to offer the opt-out?

        The particular question I am interested in, is whether you can telematch people, and call them, if they are not TPS-registered. The advice I am getting is that if they didn’t give a telephone number when they first came on your database, then you can’t, because not giving a telephone number has to be interpreted as an opt-out, even if they simply left the field blank. But if there wasn’t a telephone field at all, then technically you could.

        There is an argument that people wouldn’t reasonably expect you to telematch, therefore you can’t under the grounds it would be considered unfair.

      • I think the problem here is that if you buy a random number, PECR allows you to call if it isn’t on the TPS. However, Data Protection requires you to obtain the data fairly, which means knowing where the number came from and what the person expected. A lot of the data bought and sold in the UK is obtained at best unfairly, and in some circumstances, completely illegally.

        Appending numbers to existing records is itself an issue – because how do you tell the person it’s happening?

        Best option? Be the kind of organisation that people want to deal with direct.

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