Unambiguously yours

There’s an old joke about a tourist in Ireland asking for directions and getting the reply ‘If I was you, I wouldn’t start from here’. To anyone in the position of wondering whether to contact all of the people on their mailing list to get GDPR-standard consent to send marketing, fund-raising or promotional emails and texts, I can only say this: I wouldn’t start from here.

With apologies to regular readers who already know (there must be six of you by now), the problem comes because most of the people advising on the solution don’t seem to know what the problem is. They think that the General Data Protection Regulation makes a significant change to the nature of consent from what is required now, and so they tell their clients and employers that there is an urgent need to carry out a ‘re-consenting’ exercise. A memo has clearly gone out – a distinguished correspondent has sent me two examples of organisations sending out emails to get consent in the past week, and yesterday, the charity Stonewall used Valentine’s Day as a prompt to beg its supporters to ‘not leave us this way’. It was lovely, and it is probably an admission that Stonewall have been acting unlawfully since at least 2003, if not 1998.

Here’s the problem. The 1995 Data Protection Directive defines consent like this:

any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed


the data subject has unambiguously given his consent

If you’re new to this, read those sentences a few times. Think about ‘freely given’. Think about the consent being an ‘indication’, something by which the person ‘signifies’ their ‘agreement’. Think about ‘unambiguously given‘. If you think that this be interpreted as an opt-out, where are your car keys? Consent, according to you, is me taking your car keys and leaving you a legalistic note somewhere that says that unless you tell me not to borrow your car, I can borrow your car. Or because I borrowed it another time and you didn’t object, I can keep borrowing your car until you tell me not to.

This is nonsense. Consent cannot be inferred. It cannot be implied. A badly written opt-out buried in terms and conditions, consent assumed because I made a donation, the fact that you have my email address and you assume that I must have given it to you with my consent for marketing rather than (for example) you bought it from a list broker who launders dodgy data like drug money – none of these examples constitute consent. Consent is consent. You asked and I said yes. We all know what it means and to pretend otherwise is to lie so you can persuade yourself that you can spam people.

Yes, the GDPR adds a couple of things. It requires consent to be ‘demonstrable’. It states explicitly that consent can only be obtained by a ‘statement or by a clear affirmative action’. But if you claim that the absence of the above phrase in the Directive is any help to the opt-out model, you’re lying to yourself. An opt-out is inherently ambiguous, and the directive says that consent cannot be unambiguous. I might have misunderstood the wording (especially if the language was clunky or technical, which it often is), the data may have been obtained for a different purpose and the consent option is buried in terms and conditions, I might just have missed it or forgotten. The Directive is clear.

Jump ahead to the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations, based on Directive 2002/58/EC (often known the ePrivacy Directive). The definition of consent comes from the Data Protection Directive, and so if the ePrivacy Directive says you need consent, what you need is unambiguous, freely given, specific and informed consent. The ePrivacy Directive is enacted by the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, or PECR (which all good people pronounce as ‘Pecker’ and revel in the opportunities that doing so affords them).

PECR makes life even harder for the opt-outers. For emails, PECR says that the recipient must have “previously notified the sender that he consents for the time being to such communications being sent by, or at the instigation of, the sender“. If you think that a person can ‘notify’ you by not doing something (i.e. not opting-out), once again, where are your car keys?

Surprisingly given all the execrable practice to which the Commissioner happily turns a blind eye, Wilmslow fired a shot across everyone’s bows with three enforcement cases last year. Morrisons and Flybe are to some extent red herrings as they deliberately targeted people who had explicitly opted out of receiving direct marketing, so when the companies emailed them asking them to opt back in, it was plainly bullshit. The Honda case is more interesting, in the sense that Honda ignored everyone who had opted in (because they’d opted in) and everyone who had opted out (naturally). They contacted people where they didn’t know either way, where they held no evidence of consent. Despite the fact that in all three cases, the contact itself wasn’t selling anything, all were sent for marketing purposes, and here, the ICO argued that the organisations didn’t have consent for sending emails for marketing purposes. It’s been argued by idiots that all Honda were trying to do was comply with GDPR, but that’s patently false. They were trying to pack out their marketing list before a perceived change in the law (GDPR) while ignoring another law that was just fine thanks (PECR).

And now we come to the payoff. If Stonewall (and all the others) have consent to send fund-raising emails, they don’t need to ask again. If they don’t have freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous consent, they shouldn’t be sending emails for marketing purposes now, even if the purpose is to ask for consent from people who are happy to give it because the email is inherently unlawful. It wouldn’t be unlawful for Stonewall to write to all of its supporters and ask them for consent, because post isn’t electronic so PECR doesn’t apply. I would say that there is plainly a legitimate interest for them to use post to ask people for permission to send fund-raising and promotional correspondence by email, so there is no GDPR problem.

The problem with a re-consenting exercise is that the organisation is basically admitting to a PECR breach. The problem is exacerbated by doing that re-consenting exercise by email, because as Honda have demonstrated, doing so is in itself a breach of PECR. People complained to the ICO about the Honda emails, which is why they enforced. If you do a re-consenting exercise by email, anyone irritated enough by the request may well complain. Then what?

So what do I think organisations should do in the light of all this? Well, I wouldn’t start from here. But ignoring the law for a moment, this might be a time to be pragmatic. If you send people content that they want and you don’t annoy them (email being less annoying and distracting than phone or text in my opinion), if you have nice big bright unsubscribe buttons, and if YOU RESPECT BLOODY UNSUBSCRIBE REQUESTS (Hello Daily Telegraph), what’s the risk? Why draw attention to yourself?

I am convinced that sending emails to people who haven’t opted-in is unlawful unless you’ve got the soft opt-in (which because it’s predicated on data gathered through a sale, most charities won’t have). But many organisations have been content to do that for years despite it being unlawful now. So what’s actually changing? I think everyone should comply with the law because privacy – the right to be left alone – is a vital foundation for a civilised society. But if you’re sitting on a mailing list and you’re not sure what to do with it, I would forgive you if you took a slower, longer path, taking every natural opportunity to get renewed consent from existing contacts, getting strong unambiguous consent from anyone new, and hoping that churn and natural wastage gets you where you need to be. And if you’re wrestling with this right now and you’ve read this far, good luck and best wishes.

Small change

Some senior figures in the charity sector have sought to deal with the Information Commissioner’s recent enforcement against the RSPCA and the British Heart Foundation by suggesting that the ICO’s action is disproportionate and unfair. The fundraiser sorry, academic, Ian MacQuillin has written two blogs which touch on the theme, while a few days ago, Robert Meadowcroft, the Chief Executive of Muscular Dystrophy UK tweeted:

If the is impartial regulator it will investigate practices of and not simply pursue charities

As 2016 is now disappearing over the horizon, I thought it was worth testing the hypothesis that the ICO is taking disproportionate action against charities, and the fines and other enforcement against charities are unrepresentative. TL:DR – it’s complete nonsense.

In 2016, the ICO issued 34 civil monetary penalties – 11 under the Data Protection Act, and 23 under the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations (PECR). There are a number of different ways of looking at the figures, and none of them show any evidence of disproportionality.

1) Charity CMPs as a proportion of the total in 2016

Of the 34 penalties, 2 were against charities, so 6% of the ICO’s CMPs in 2016 were against charities.

2) Amount charities were fined, as a proportion of the total in 2016

The CMP total was £3,225,500. The total of CMPs issued against charities was £43,000. This is 1.3% of the total.

3) Proportion of Data Protection CMPs issued to charities in 2016

If you look only at the CMPs issued under Data Protection, the charity proportion is not insignificant – there were 11 DP CMPs, so the 2 charity CMPs are 18% of the total – the same as the police, 1 more than councils, but less than the private sector or the NHS (3 each). However, this is the only comparison where charities feature significantly, and they are not the dominant sector. The next two comparisons are also instructive.

4) Proportion of PECR CMPs issued to charities in 2016

None. This is despite widespread breaches of PECR by charities, including phoning donors who are on TPS and sending texts and emails without consent (for example, the vast majority of mobile numbers gathered via charity posters in 2016 were obtained in breach of PECR).

5) Proportion of CMPs issued for marketing related activities in 2o16

There were 21 PECR CMPs related to marketing, and 2 DP CMPs related to marketing, making 23 marketing CMPs in all. 2 were against charities, which is 9.5% of the total. Given the big charities’ disastrous approach to marketing, this relatively small number is astonishing.

6) Level of CMPs in 2016

The average DP CMP was £108,500; the average charity DP CMP was £21,500.

The average PECR CMP was £84,666.75; there were no charity PECR CMPs.

The highest DP CMP was £400,000; the highest charity DP CMP was £25,000.

7) Other enforcement in 2016

There were 22 enforcement notices issued by the ICO in 2016, 8 under DP and 14 under PECR. 1 of the 8 DP enforcement notices was against a charity, which is 4.5% of the total, or 12.5% of the total DP enforcement notices. Either way, it is a small percentage of the total. Again, if you count the number of marketing related enforcement notices, there were 15, of which 1 was against a charity. This is 6.6% of the total.

8) CMPs since 2010

There have been 69 DP CMPs since 2010 that I can find (they drop off the ICO’s website after a few years); 4 were issued against registered charities, which is 5.8% of the total. The average DP CMP was £114, 163, whereas the average charity was £78,250. It is worth noting that these figures are slightly skewed by the £200,000 penalty against the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, which is a registered charity but receives most of its funding from the NHS.

The CMP against the British Heart Foundation was the 8th lowest CMP overall, while the CMP against the RSPCA was the 9th lowest. The only organisations to receive lower penalties than the charities were small businesses, unincorporated associations, and a bankrupt lawyer.

There have been 47 PECR CMPs that I can find since 2012; none have been issued on charities, which is 0% of the total.


These figures will likely be different in 2017. The ICO has signalled that more DP enforcement against charities is coming, and so the proportion of DP penalties may rise when the totals are in, but that depends on a variety of different factors including the number of other penalties and the ICO’s general approach. However, when you look at the facts for 2016, MacQuillin and Meadowcroft are wrong. Despite years of ignoring the Data Protection and PECR requirements in favour of a flawed, fundraiser-driven approach, the ICO has not taken disproportionate action against the charities. The action taken is a small percentage of the overall total. Special pleading and blame-shifting will not help the sector. Compliance with the law will.

Caesar’s Wife

In May 2016, the Labour member for Heatons North, Alex Ganotis, became Leader of Stockport Council, having been a councillor for some years. A month or so later, I read a story mentioning him in the Manchester Evening News, and his name rang a bell. Alex Ganotis is also a Group Manager at the Information Commissioner’s Office – I know this because he has signed hundreds of FOI Decision Notices on behalf of the Commissioner.

I made an FOI request to the ICO to find out more about Mr Ganotis’ role – in particular, I wanted to know how likely it was that a professional politician might be involved in complaints to the ICO involving political parties or local government. If Mr Ganotis worked on financial services or health, for example, he would need to maintain a high degree of professionalism and neutrality, but there would be no immediate conflict of interest. So I asked the ICO what team he manages. The answer:

Mr Ganotis manages a team of staff who deal with complaints and concerns about councils and political parties

I had to read this several times before I could take it in.

The ICO’s Policy on party political activities is helpfully published on its website. It makes reassuring reading:

The ICO is an independent body and it is important for it to be free from party political bias, and to be clearly seen and acknowledged as being free from such bias……. It is of paramount importance that the ICO is acknowledged as being free from party political bias and influence. The work that we do can often be of a politically sensitive nature and any substantiated allegations of bias would have serious repercussions for the future of the ICO.

The policy sets out a process through which an ICO employee can gain approval for party political activities. I asked when Ganotis went through this process, and the ICO revealed that he was approved in October 2008, which means that his dual ICO / councillor role went on for nearly eight years before he became Leader – he did not seek re-approval when he became Leader, so it seems that the ICO has not reassessed his role now he is a council leader, nor has he asked for this to happen.

I asked for recorded information about the approval process for his role. The ICO has nothing. I asked for any recorded information about measures taken to ensure, in the Policy’s words, that ‘potential for conflicts of interest’ have been minimised with regard to Mr Ganotis’ role. Nothing is held. The ICO added “Mr Ganotis’ line manager and his peers are responsible for assigning decision notices and make a judgement on a case-by-case basis as to what he is assigned, taking into account whether individual cases could pose a potential conflict of interest.” There are no formal arrangements, no written criteria or parameters, nothing to measure or audit against. The ICO enthusiastically fines organisations hundreds of thousands of pounds for failing to maintain properly documented processes, but in the case of having a professional politician managing a team that deals with hundreds of complaints about political parties and councils, the ICO itself sees no need for rigour. Trust whoever decided that this is OK, Wilmslow says, because we have nothing else to offer.

Mr Ganotis is a Group Manager, answering to a Head of Department, but the ICO’s response makes clear that the former Information Commissioner himself, Richard Thomas, approved of the arrangement: “the Commissioner at that time was made aware of his standing and subsequent election“. When I wrote this blog originally, I assumed it was Christopher Graham who was Commissioner, but he did not take over until 2009. ICO trivia fans may remember that Graham was himself once a councillor (for the Liberal Party) and a twice-unsuccessful parliamentary candidate – one wonders if he knew about Ganotis’ status, and if he did not, why nobody told him.

Anyone who has political beliefs or leanings and works in local or central government knows the awkward but vital requirement to set those beliefs aside and act neutrally in the public interest. As a Labour voter in every election since 1992, I have done it myself. It is not easy, but you don’t need to be a saint to achieve it. I cast no doubt on Mr Ganotis’ personal integrity, or ability to do the same. But anyone who thinks that’s the point just needs to Google the title of this blog.

Mr Ganotis has signed hundreds of FOI decision notices on behalf of the Information Commissioner, exercising the Commissioner’s statutory powers. Those notices include  councils across the UK, and government departments run by ministers who, in his other role, Mr Ganotis publicly opposes, and he has been doing so for years. The ICO disclosed to me a spreadsheet of the cases that Ganotis’ team has dealt with since January 2014 (records before that are routinely destroyed). A quick glance at the organisations concerned give a flavour of the issues that pass across the team’s desk in just one month. In July 2016, I can see the Labour Party (8 times), Momentum, Saving Labour, and Progress. It is hard to imagine any team would be more steeped in politics and arguments about political activity than this one, and the (former) Information Commissioner decided that a professional politician was the right person to manage it.

Over the past few years, the Labour Party has carried out its obnoxious and unfair purge, struggled with allegations of member data misuse on all sides (Corbyn, Momentum and Owen Smith), and demonstrated the traditional party blindness to PECR. I have myself blogged sorrowfully but repeatedly about Labour’s Data Protection and privacy woes for several years. In all of that time, only David Lammy’s doomed automated calls have faced any enforcement action (and he wasn’t even an official Labour candidate in the election concerned). To be clear, I have no evidence of any influence being brought to bear on this. But, as the ICO’s own policy states explicitly, “the organisation does seek to ensure that the potential for conflicts of interest is minimised as is the possibility of the ICO being accused of being politically biased“. In this, Mr Ganotis, his line manager and the former Commissioner have failed, and failed spectacularly. How can anyone in politics have confidence in the ICO’s decisions?

Any FOI decision notice involving a council or a government department signed by Mr Ganotis could be tainted, and there are hundreds of them. The ICO’s failure to take action against the Labour Party for a consistently terrible approach to Data Protection and privacy issues is no longer just over-caution, but potentially something far more objectionable. Every case Mr Ganotis has been involved in could be perfect, but the ICO cannot guarantee this with a straight face; their own policy recognises the problem of perception, but their practice is blind to it. They could have moved Ganotis at any point since 2008 to another job of equal standing, and the problem would have evaporated. He is still in place.

That Mr Ganotis could not see that continuing to manage a team responsible for complaints about political parties and councils was incompatible with his role first as councillor and then as Council Leader raises a question about his judgement. That the ICO’s management was either unwilling or incapable of identifying and remedying the potential conflict of interest is a matter of serious public concern.

I have spent a decade and a half criticising, satirising and annoying the ICO in the hope that for no other reason than to spite me, they will become a more effective, more enthusiastic regulator of Data Protection. But this is too much. This is a genuine failure of governance. It could pollute a host of formal decisions (and indecisions) stretching back for years. It has to be dealt with.

I don’t understand how Mr Ganotis could ever sensibly manage the team responsible for political parties and enjoy the confidence of the public. Richard Thomas and Chris Graham should have stopped it, and I hope that the new Commissioner will ask questions about how her managers and Human Resources team could allow such a shocking situation to occur. But if all this isn’t put right, if this bizarre conflict of interest continues acknowledged but unaddressed, we should all look very closely at every decision that emerges from Wilmslow with a more sceptical eye than even I thought possible.

Brand new key

Parents at schools in Suffolk recently received an interesting piece of correspondence about an exciting initiative called ‘Suffolk SAFEKey‘, offered by Suffolk Police. For as little as £1 a month, subscribers to the service receive a special key fob with a reference number on it. Once registered, if the keys are lost, the person can use the reference number to contact Suffolk Police’s commercial partner (Keycare Limited) to get keys and owner reunited, incentivised by a £10 reward.

Alerted to this by a concerned citizen, I made an FOI request to Suffolk Police to find out more about the scheme, the arrangement with Keycare Limited, and how the email came to be sent. Suffolk Police told me that they contacted all 18 secondary schools in the county (by phone, so I don’t know how the request was couched), and of those, 8 forwarded the invitation to join SAFEKey to all parents. The force were unhelpfully vague about who else had been approached. I asked who they had contacted, and their answer conflated those they approached and those they claim had approached them. This means I know that those involved are charities (Suffolk Community Foundation / Age UK), “advocacy groups” (whatever that means), Neighbourhood Watch, the University of Suffolk and “lunch clubs and other such groups”, but I don’t know who contacted who.

On one issue, Suffolk Police were admirably clear. I asked them how they had obtained consent to send the email. This was their reply:

The parentmail service is not controlled by the Constabulary and the information provided is not personal data and as such, there is no requirement for us to obtain consent from those third party recipients.

Regulation 22 of the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003 (AKA PECR)  applies to emails and texts, and it is remarkably unambiguous, despite all the dodgy marketers and list brokers who purport not to understand it.

a person shall neither transmit, nor instigate the transmission of, unsolicited communications for the purposes of direct marketing by means of electronic mail unless the recipient of the electronic mail has previously notified the sender that he consents for the time being to such communications being sent by, or at the instigation of, the sender

Suffolk Police instigated the sending of the email to parents by making an unsolicited approach to schools, asking them to send it. The email would not have been sent unless they had asked for it to be sent. Regulation 22 does not require them to be the sender. Should there be any doubt about this, the ICO asked Better Together to sign an undertaking following their misbegotten texts during the Scottish Independence campaign. Better Together used an agency – they never held the data and they didn’t send the texts. This is exactly the same situation. There are only two ways that marketing emails could be sent in this way: either parents would have to give consent direct to Suffolk Police, or give consent to the school to receive marketing from the force. This second possibility is one the ICO is keen to play down, as their Direct Marketing Guidance makes clear:

Indirect consent may therefore be valid if that organisation was specifically named. But if the consent was more general (eg marketing ‘from selected third parties’) this will not demonstrate valid consent to marketing calls, texts or emails.

Of course, as the senders of the emails, the schools have also breached PECR. And taking it one stage further, you could argue that Suffolk Police have also breached the Data Protection Act by processing personal data unfairly and unlawfully. If they don’t have a data processor contract with the schools, they may even have breached the seventh principle.

Many public bodies and charities struggle with PECR because they perceive ‘marketing’ as a purely commercial activity. This means that they think the messages they send are somehow not marketing, and are surprised when PECR bites. Suffolk Police can be under no such illusion. SAFEKey is not a policing activity, it is a wholly commercial venture, with the income split 50/50 between the force and Keycare Ltd. Moreover, there is an argument that the force is exploiting its position as a law enforcement body to promote its commercial activities – it’s unlikely that secondary schools would forward information about double glazing or PPI. The force might want this to seem like an aspect of their crime prevention work, but it isn’t – it’s a purely commercial venture. No public body, but especially not the police, should exploit their position as partners with other, smaller public bodies to plug their commercial activities.

There are other concerns. The force didn’t carry out a Privacy Impact Assessment before launching the SAFEKey scheme, which is surprising, as the project involves the force gathering personal data it does not need to carry out its legal functions, purely for the purpose of a commercial venture, using a variety of unrelated bodies as a conduit for the data and transmitting it to a commercial partner. At the very least, you would expect them to consider the risks. Moreover, although the extract I received from the contract between Keycare and Suffolk Police does make it clear that Keycare cannot use or share the personal data they receive for their own purposes, the security demands made by the police are relentlessly generic.

I don’t think the police should exploit the significant position of trust they enjoy to flog commercial services at all. But even if you disagree, there can be no question than when they do, the police should at all times obey the law. They haven’t done so here, and the ICO should investigate. As I did not receive one of the emails, they would ignore any complaint that I made, but they should intervene to make clear to all public bodies how PECR works.


Less than ideal

Last week, Stephen Lee, an academic and former fundraiser was reported as having attacked the Information Commissioner’s Office for their interpretation of direct marketing at a fundraising conference. It was, he said “outrageous” that the Commissioner’s direct marketing guidance stated that any advertising or marketing material that promoted the aims and ideals of a not-for-profit organisation was covered by Data Protection. According to Lee, only fundraising activities should be considered to be marketing.

[NB: Third Sector articles are sometimes open to all and sometimes limited to subscribers. If the links don’t work, please accept my apologies!]

He is quoted as saying “Who says that’s right? Just the ICO. Who did it consult? No one.” and  went on to say “Why and how and in what way should we be compelled to comply with that proposition?”

Who says that’s right? Who did the ICO consult? Well, let me see now.

1) The Council of Europe

In 1985, the Council of Europe issued a Recommendation on the protection of personal data used for the purposes of direct marketing. The definition of direct marketing includes both the offer of goods or services and “any other messages” to a segment of the population. The recommendation predates the guidance Mr Lee disparages by more than 30 years.

2) The 1995 Data Protection Directive

The Directive makes clear that direct marketing rules apply equally to charitable organisations and political parties as they do to commercial organisations, and emphasises the need for people to be able to opt-out of direct marketing. By redrawing the definition, Mr Lee would contradict this fundamental right.

3) The Data Protection Act 1998

Given that Mr Lee feels qualified to make bold statements about the interpretation of the Data Protection Act, it’s odd that he doesn’t seem to have taken the time to read it. Section 11 of the Act states that the definition of Direct Marketing “the communication (by whatever means) of any advertising and marketing material which is directed at particular individuals”. The important word there is “any” – organisations do not get to pick and choose which of their promotional messages are covered and which are not.

4) The Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003

PECR sets up the rules for consent over electronic direct marketing (consent for automated calls, opt-out and TPS for live calls, consent for emails and texts). It does not define direct marketing, but instead says this “Expressions used in these Regulations that are not defined in paragraph (1) and are defined in the Data Protection Act 1998 shall have the same meaning as in that Act”. Therefore, the DPA definition applies to PECR.

5) The Information Tribunal (now the First Tier Tribunal)

In 2005, the Information Commissioner served an Enforcement Notice on the Scottish National Party after they repeatedly and unrepentantly used automated calls featuring Sean Connery to promote the party in the General Election. The SNP appealed, and in 2006, the Information Tribunal considered the issue. One of the main elements of the SNP appeal was against the ICO’s definition of direct marketing. Although the case is about a political party, the ICO’s submissions are based on the proposition that charities as well as political parties are covered by the definition of direct marketing, and that the definition cannot be restricted to fundraising alone. The Tribunal accepted the ICO’s view in full, and dismissed the appeal.

6) The charity sector and anyone else who wanted to be consulted

The ICO may have issued guidance in the 1980s or 1990s on the definition of direct marketing, but the idea that promoting aims and ideals is part of it has been their view since 1999. In guidance issued on the precursor to PECR, the ICO stated clearly that direct marketing includes “not just to the offer for sale of goods or services, but also the promotion of an organisations aims and ideals”. They specifically mentioned charities, as they have ever since. Virtually every iteration of the ICO’s guidance on PECR and direct marketing has been subject to public consultation – indeed, the very guidance Lee is talking about was subject to a public consultation.

Here’s the problem. Lee is an Honorary Fellow of the Institute of Fundraising, and has a long association with it. The IoF has been the most consistently pernicious influence on the charity sector’s compliance with data protection and privacy law in the past ten years. Their guidance and public utterances on data protection are often misleading, and they recently had to change their own Code of Practice because it was legally incorrect. At best, they haven’t noticed the ICO position on charities and direct marketing for more than 15 years. At worst, they deliberately ignored it in favour of an interpretation that largely suits fundraisers. Lee complained at the conference about the “appalling” communication between the ICO and charity umbrella bodies, but Richard Marbrow of the ICO summed the problem up all too well:

One of the things the sector asked for was clarity, and I will try and bring you that. The trouble is, if you then say ‘we don’t like that clarity, could we have some different clarity please?’, we’re not going to get on very well.”

The most important thing about Lee’s outburst is the subtext – if any form of communication is not covered by the definition of direct marketing, then your consent is not required  in the first place and you have no right to stop receiving it. His interpretation is nonsense, but it is also ethically unsound. At its most basic level, privacy means the right to be left alone, the right to have an area of your life which is yours, which others can’t intrude into. Lee seems to want to erode that right. If his view was correct (it’s not), charities could bombard people with phone calls, texts or emails to tell them how marvellous they are, how important their work is, how vital they are for society. As long as they don’t ask for money, the logic of his argument is that people wouldn’t be able to stop them.

Lee’s other question (“Why and how and in what way should we be compelled to comply with that proposition?”) has an easy answer. Ignore it. Carry on breaching the law, ignoring the rules. I went to the cinema last night and saw adverts for two different charities that plainly breached PECR, so that seems to be the plan. Given that the furore over charities began with an innocent person bombarded with unwanted correspondence, it’s remarkable that senior figures in the charity sector are ready for another go, but if Mr Lee wants to drag charities’ reputations deeper into a swamp that they share with PPI scammers and payday loan merchants, he’s welcome.

But the ICO should not listen to their concerns, or open friendly channels of communication with the sector. They should apply the law firmly and regularly until the charities get the message. If this results in more enforcement against charities than other sectors, that will be only because the big charities are among the worst offenders and they haven’t put their houses in order. If charity giving suffers as a result, even amongst the many charities that have not transgressed, they should stop blaming others and look to their fundraisers, their colleagues and themselves.